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ABSTRACT
Boston is in the midst of a housing crisis, in respose to
which the City has incorporated two policies "linkage" and
"inclusionary zoning" into its planning process. This
thesis is an analysis of how the two policies impact the
financial feasibility of the Pier 4 project -- a mixed-use
development.
Linkage calls for commercial developers to contribute a
specified amount of money towards the development of low to
moderate income housing. A developer faced with this
requirement can either contribute its linkage money to a
housing trust fund annually for a specified amount of time
or build affordable housing units of which the value of the
units must equal the linkage payment.
Inclusionary housing requires residential developers,
building on private land, to set aside a specified number of
housing units within a project for low to moderate income
household.
The Boston Mariner Company is proposing to develop a mixed-
use project. As the project will include both commercial
and residential uses, the City is requesting Mariner to
address both the inclusionary and linkage requirements.
Together, the two policies pose serious problems to the
financial feasibility of the project.
The thesis evaluates the financial, political and managerial
implications of the two requirements on the Pier 4
project. The thesis concludes first with recommendations to the
Boston Mariner Company regarding how it should satisfy both
requirements; and second, with recommendations to the City
of Boston suggesting ways in which the City can improve the
implemention process of both policies.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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OVERVIEW
Boston is in the midst of a housing crisis, in
response to which the City has incorporated two regulatory
mechanisms into its planning process which are geared to
mitigate the housing shortage. Specifically, these tools
are "linkage" and, "inclusionary zoning".
In essence, linkage calls for developers to contribute
a specified amount of money towards the creation of low to
moderate income housing, while inclusionary zoning requires
developers to set aside a specified number of housing units
within a housing project for low to moderate income
households. Though the specifics of both regulatory
mechanisms vary with individual development projects, i.e.
the former tool is targeted at commercial development while
the latter is aimed at residential developers, the
intentions of the two are identical. Both tools are
intended create additional housing units in Boston.
The thesis explores the present linkage program and
inclusionary housing policy and the potential impact of the
two concepts on developers and Boston's housing stock. To
illustrate the ramifications of the linkage and inclusionary
requirement, the thesis will focus on one particular
developer, the Boston Mariner Company, which is presently
faced with both a linkage obligation and an inclusionary
housing requirement related to its proposed Pier 4
development. The fact that Mariner must satisfy both the
requirements raises an interesting question. Do the two
8
policies together serve as a disincentive for developers to
produce mixed-use projects?
Mariner's linkage requirement translates into
approximately $6,000,000 to be paid to the City over a
twelve year period. Payments begin the year Mariner
receives its final certificate of occupancy. The money will
go towards the creation of low to moderate income housing.
Mariner is under pressure by both the City and the
State to provide 10% of its residential units for low to
moderate income households. While the linkage program has
been amended into the zoning code by Boston's Zoning
Commission and passed into law, inclusionary zoning is only
an idea. There is no legal enforcement of the requirement -
the policy is still in draft form.
The City's requirements leave Mariner with no choice
but to cooperate with the City in order to obtain approvals.
While Mariner accepts the linkage exaction and the
inclusionary requirement, the manner in which Mariner is to
satisfy them is yet to be determined.
Analytical Framework
To explore and evaluate the actions Mariner should
undertake in satisfying both obligations the thesis will: 1)
establish the City's ground rules within which the Boston
Mariner Comapny must comply; 2) evaluate the financial
impact of the inclusionary requirement on the Pier 4
project; 3) evaluate the financial, managerial, and
9
marketing feasibility of the development options available
to Mariner through the linkage program; and lastly, based
upon the findings, 4) propose to Mariner possible ways of
satisfying both requirements.
While much of the thesis will focus on project
specific decisions confronting Mariner, it is through the
developers lens that the viability of linkage and
inclusionary zoning will be evaluated. The analysis will
serve as a focused means of looking at the impact of two
innovative mechanisms on developers.
The thesis will, therefore, address the following
questions in analyzing the impact of inclusionary zoning and
linkage on mixed-use development projects and on the
development of affordable housing in Boston: 1) What is the
appropriate means by which a city can foster the development
of affordable housing?; 2) Given the lack of precedent for
the current linkage program and the lack of legal basis for
the inclusionary housing policy, how can developers best
approach the City for approvals and also be socially
responsible?; 3) What does the City receive from developers
in terms of linkage payments?
Chapter One establishes the context within which
Mariner's Pier 4 project takes place; it is divided into two
sections. The first section of this chapter focuses on the
government agencies that influence the development industry
in Boston. Included in this discussion, although will not
be government related, will be a description of the South
10
Boston community, the neighborhood identified by the City as
the "impacted" area.
The second section of the chapter sets forth the
specific guidelines, zoning regulations, and housing
policies that impact the Pier 4 project. The section will
outline the linkage program and establish the context within
which the inclusionary housing policy is enforced.
Chapter Two takes a close look at the City's
inclusionary housing requirement. The chapter first
explores the implications of the policy on the Pier 4
project. As will be revealed, by providing a specified
number of below-market rate units on-site, the financial
feasibility of the project is largely threatened. The
inclusion of below-market rate units force Mariner to
increase the price of the market-rate units by 10%.
Second, the chapter analyzes the market risks that
confront Mariner and explores how the inclusionary
requirement futher exacerbates the risks. The Pier 4
project can not be analyzed in a vacuum; it must be
evaluated within the context of the Boston's real estate
economy. For example, how will increased development effect
Mariner's ability to lease space and sell condominiums?
What is the projected market for condominium buyers? How
likely is it that the City and State will improve the
infrastructure surrounding the Pier 4 site?
Much of the success of the project is contingent upon
promises made by the City and State regarding infrasturcture
11
development. How likely is it that these promises will be
delivered? In short, given these risks how volitile is the
Pier 4 project given the inclusionary requirement?
Third, the chapter looks at the opportunity costs of
building below market rate units offsite as opposed to
onsite. While Mariner is able to physically build
affordable units onsite, the cost of doing so is extremely
high. At the cost of what it takes to produce affordable
housing on the Pier 4 site, the City of Boston could build
250 units elsewhere.
Chapter Three focuses on the City's current linkage
policy. Developers faced with linkage obligations can
satisfy the requirement by either giving payments to a trust
fund or by actually building units in equal value to the
payment. While the options appear to be clear cut, deciding
which route to take is complex. If Mariner builds, does it
develop housing alone or with a partner? If Mariner builds,
should it sell or rent the units? Who will manage its
property? If Mariner transfers money to the trust fund,
will the money sit in a blind pool or will it be directed
towards the "impacted" area? The chapter identifies and
discusses the complexities associated with each choice.
Chapter Four, the final chapter, synthesizes the
information set forth in the linkage and inclusionary zoning
analysis. Recommendations are made to Mariner regarding
actions to be taken in order to satisfy both requirements.
In addition, the chapter concludes with a general discussion
12
of the two policies and offers programatic suggestions which
the City can incorporate into its administrative process.
13
CHAPTER ONE
RULES OF THE GAME
Those wishing to build in Boston must be fit and
committed to survive the arduous approval process created,
controlled, and implemented by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA). A recent Wall Steet Journal article
commented that,".. .finishing a major project in Boston takes
time and sheer persistance... In Boston, a lack of written
rules - not an excess - makes building so frustrating.
Zoning is so outdated that every large-scale project is
treated as an exception. This opens the door for what can
seem like endless reviews by the BRA and local residents".
(Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1986, pg.24)
To assure that development projects blend in with the
fabric of the surrounding architectural, historical, and
cultural environment, the City requires developers to make a
rigorous journey through the BRA's approval process. For
many developers, the time spent negotiating with the City
and affected residents, can jeopardize the financial
feasibility of a project as carrying costs can and quite
often do get out of hand. However, as a trade-off for what
at times appears to be an endless battle, the City, the
developers and constituencies benefit.
CONTEXT
The Boston Mariner Company exemplifies what it means to
be a "fit and committed" developer in Boston. Mariner is in
the midst of its development review process, eager to
14
receive its building permit from the Inspectional Service
Department (ISD) of Boston so that construction of the Pier
4 project can begin.
The proposed development will be located on a 16.4 acre
parcel, (of which 7.5 acres are under water), on the
Northern section of South Boston. The mixed-use project
consists of office space, residential, hotel and retail,
parking, recreational open space and marine related uses
totalling 1,737,000 square feet.
The proposed development project will bring many
public benefits to a presently underutilized section of
town. During the long construction period, of three
consecutive phases of 2 to 2 1/2 years each, the project
will generate 1,200 person years of construction work. Once
the project is in full operation, 3,000 permanant jobs will
be added to Boston's labor force. In addition, substantial
new real estate taxes will be added to Boston's tax base.
The project will activate an underutilized segment of
Boston's waterfront. (See Exhibit 1) The proposed project
will promote the use of Boston's Inner Harbor for both
recreation and transportation, and extend the BRA's
Harborpark Plan. The project will also provide substantial
infrastructre and public amenities to the City, including a
large plaza at the head of the marina. (Master PDA pg.6)
The entire project will be financed through private
investment. Total development costs of the project are
15
EXHIBIT i
Potential
Development
Areas
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projected to be $400 million. Of this amount, Mariner
expects to raise $64 million in cash equity and contribute
8.0 acres of land valued at $16 million. The Pier 4 project
is unusual in this respect; most previous downtown
waterfront projects in Boston have been assisted by the
public sector through substantial subsidies such as land
write-downs, tax abatements, and land carry through the
start of construction.
Mariner also owns the parcel adjacent to the site
which is to be ground leased to HBC Development Associates,
proponents of the Fan Pier project. As it is presently
scheduled, of geotechnical necessity, both Mariner and HBC
will begin construction at the same time. While it has been
helpful for Mariner to have HBC alongside through the
approvals process, the fact that both firms will be
producing residential and commercial space at the same time
could hinder Mariner.
Table 1 illustrates the phasing schedule of the Pier 4
project and the overall program of the Fan Pier development.
Once both developers receive their approvals, they will be
competing for similar tenants to lease space and consumers
to purchase condominiums. However, by varying the floor
plates, the unit sizes of the condominiums, and the overall
project design, Mariner will mitigate the competition to as
great an extent as possible.
The development of Pier 4 will serve as a catalyst
stimulating development activity for other projects being
17
Table 1
Specifications for Pier 4 and Fan Pier Developments
Pier 4
(as of 7/1/86)
PHASE I:
Hotel
Office
Retail
Condominium
269,831
249,450
50,827
167,820
sf
sf
sf
sf
Fan Pier
(as of 2/12/86)
(290 keys)
(100 unit)
PHASE II:
Retail
Condominium
737,928 sf
19,500 sf
439,920 sf
459,420 sf
(300 unit)
PHASE III:
Office
Retail
Condominium
322,440
9,024
121,000
sf
sf
sf (80 unit)
452,464 sf
PROJECT TOTAL:
Hotel
Office
Retail
Condominium
269,831
571,890
79,351
728,740
sf
sf
sf
sf
(290 keys)
1,649,812 sf
854,000 sf
1,406,000 sf
153,000 sf
834,000 sf
3,247,000 sf
PROGRAM PERCENTAGES:
Hotel 16.4 %
Office 34.7 %
Retail 4.8 %
Condominium 44.2 %
26.3 %
43.4 %
4.7 %
25.7 %
100 %100 %
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considered for the area. Therefore, anticipating future
growth the City is carefully reviewing and evaluating all
aspects of the Pier 4 project. What follows is a brief
description of the approval procedures and policies (those
relevant to the thesis) that Mariner must go through in
order to begin construction.
First, before a final building permit can be
obtained, specific changes with the existing land use
regulations need to occur on the site and agreements need to
be made between the BRA and Mariner. The proposed mixed-use
project does not conform to the current zoning map which
classifies the site as W-2, waterfront industrial with an
FAR of 2.
Hence, Mariner is required by the Boston Zoning
Commission, in accordance with the Boston Zoning Code, to
either obtain a Master Planned Development Area (PDA)
designation or seek multiple variances for the necessary
zoning changes. Mariner chose the former alternative -- to
obtain a PDA designation.
------------------------------------------------------
1) The Master PDA designation approves the concept of a
master plan. In essence, the BRA approves the density, FAR,
total square footage, total square footage by use, and
zoning changes. Following the BRA's approval of the
specifics, the zoning commission must adopt a map amendment
and the Board of Appeals must grant exceptions to the zoning
code. Once the exceptions are granted and the map amended,
Mariner must submit architectural renderings and schematic
designs for the project to the BRA. Once again, the design
of the project is subject to review. It is quite likely
that during the review process deviations from the original
PDA will occur.
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Second, Mariner is required to enter into a housing
agreement with the BRA. As the proposed development exceeds
100,000 square feet of commercial square footage, it is
categorized under Boston's Zoning Code as a Development
Impact Project (DIP). The DIP process is the mechanism from
which Boston's housing linkage program originates.
Third, Mariner is required to respond to the City's
unstated, unenforced inclusionary housing policy. This
requirement pressures Mariner to provide a specified number
of below market rate units as part of the overall project.
The PDA designation and the DIP agreement are just a
few of steps in the approval that Mariner must recognize. In
addition, the inclusionary housing requirement issue needs
to be considered and resolved between Mariner and the City.
DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS
Development Impact Projects: The Linkage Mechanism
The DIP process was created in December 1983, when the
Boston Zoning Commission amended the Boston Zoning Code by
adopting Article 26. The creation of Article 26 established
a mechanism by which developers of large-scale projects are
required to contribute a DIP exaction - otherwise known as a
"linkage" payment for the creation of low to moderate income
housing.
Initially, the linkage formula required "developers of
large-scale commercial projects to pay $5 per square foot
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for every square foot over 100,000 square feet of new or
substantially rehabilitated commercial space." (DIP
Agreement) A developer faced with a linkage requirement was
given the option to transfer the payment to a Housing Trust
Fund (Fund) or to directly develop housing. If a developer
chose to build housing, the linkage payment would equal the
difference between the cost and proceeds from affordable
sales and rentals.
Under the 1983 amendment, a developer who chose the
first option would have paid the linkage amount over a
twelve year period, to the Fund, beginning two years after
the issuance of the building permit, or upon the issuance of
the certificate of occupancy - whichever came first. The
second option, which was (and still is ) to build the
housing directly, requires a developer to submit a proposal
in writing to the BRA describing the number, location, cost
and design of the housing units. The proposal must satisfy
all the requirements set forth in the Development Impact
Project agreement.
Two years later, Article 26, which set forth the scope
of the linkage mechanism was once again amended. Although
the concept and purpose behind the payment were the same,
the manner in which it was to be collected differed
significantly. Rather than spreading the payments over a
twelve year period beginning either two years after the
issuance of a building permit or upon certificate of
occupancy, the new formula requires developers to pay upon
21
issuance of a building permit and over a seven year period.
In addition to the $5 housing contribution, developers are
also required to contribute $1 per square foot in excess of
100,000 square feet of commercial space to a Job Fund.
From the City's perspective, more funding would be
acquired upfront and be "available sooner for affordable
housing". From the developer's perspective, the new formula
imposes more upfront costs. The additi"iial expense incurred
by the developer, by shortening the linkage pay-in period,
is money that could be used to fugld a project's initial
lease-up deficit.
The Boston Mariner's linkage payment totals
$5,586,432. It is payable over a twelve year period with
the first payment due upon issuance of its certificate of
occupancy. This includes the $1 per square foot in excess
of 100,000 square feet that Mariner must pay to the City's
job creation fund.
Inclusionary Zoning Policy
On June 12, 1986 Mayor Flynn recommended to the BRA
that it amend Boston's Zoning Code by adding a new provision
entitled, "Inclusionary Zoning". Flynn's proposal "allows
developers of rental and sale dwelling units to increase the
density and or height of of their projects if they set aside
a specified percentage of the units for rental and/or
purchase by members of low to moderate income households".
(Boston Business Journal, June 30 1986 -P.G. Garrity) The
City's proposal requires developers using public land to set
22
aside 35% of the units for low to moderate income residents
while developers using private land must set aside 10% of
the units. For Mariner, this means producing 50 below
market rate units on the Pier 4 site.
Though inclusionary zoning may be a means of producing
affordable housing, the manner in which the City is
implementing the policy is vulnerable to legal challenge.
For the City of Boston to incorporate an inclusionary zoning
amendment into the zoning code, the Flynn administration
must first have the Massachusetts State Legislature amend
Boston's Zoning Enabling Law (Chapter 665). It is unlikely
that the City will alter the Enabling Law by the time the
Mariner project takes place. Therefore, until this measure
is taken by the City, legal grounds do not exist to enforce
such a requirement -- at least to developers using their own
land.
If a developer faced with an inclusionary requirement
challenged this policy in court, "the court would have
absolutely no choice but to strike the inclusionary
requirement down.... unless the legislature provides its
authorization by amending Chapter 665". (Boston Business
Journal, 6/30/86, P.G. Garrity, pg. 24)
A similar situation occured in the city of Newton,
Massachusetts. Since 1960, Newton has required residential
developers to include a certain percentage of units for low
to moderate income households. In the mid 70's the housing
policy was challenged by a developer. "Ultimately the
23
Commonwealth Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) struck the
zoning down in the case of Middlesex and Boston Street
Railway Company vs. Board of Alderman of Newton, 371 Mass.
849. The essence of the SJC's decision was that Newton's
zoning ordinance was not specifically authorized by the
Commonwealth Zoning Enabling Act (Chapter 40A) to attach
such a condition to the granting of special permits". (BBJ)
Despite the fact that the policy could be easily
challenged by a developer, the requirement still has a
stronghold on the outcome of the Mariner project. The Flynn
administration insists that if Mariner wishes to receive its
final building permit, cooperating with the City in terms of
the inclusionary request could expedite the process.
ACTORS
The development guidelines and policies are created,
enforced and implemented by a variety of departments within
Boston's City government. What follows is a brief
description of those actors involved in the planning
processes of the City. Also included in this section is a
description of the South Boston community, the neighborhood
most affected by the development project.
The Boston Redevelopment Authority
The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) is one of the
City's two planning agencies directly responsible for
coordinating development projects and reviewing development
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proposals. Projects may require zoning review initiated by
a request for a building or occupancy permit, review of
financing mechanisms such as chapter 121A and review of
proposals for publicly owned land.
The BRA reviews proposals for the overall viability and
expected benefits to the city. Review criteria may vary
depending on the size of project, location and type. Design
criteria, environmental concerns, and neighborhood impacts
such as displacement and community participation are also
considered in the review process.
The BRA is ultimately responsible for reviewing
proposals and disposing land in areas that are considered
within its jurisdiction. The areas that the BRA controls
are specific Urban Renewal Areas (URA) located primarily in
the City's central core. URA sections include the South
End, North End, Back Bay, Roxbury, and Beacon Hill.
The Public Facilities Department
The Public Facilities Department (PFD), which recently
merged with the Neighborhood Development and Economic
Agency, is the Mayor's planning agency, the second of the
City's two planning agencies. PFD is responsible for
planning, designing, and rebuilding the City's public
infrastructure. In addition, PFD is responsible for
transferring City-owned land and buildings for housing and
commercial development and to act as the conduit for the
Commonwealth for the expenditure of State housing funds and
to revitalize the City's neighborhood business districts.
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Whereas PFD is similar to the BRA in that both are
planning agencies responsible for orchestrating development,
PFD's sphere of influence is outside that of the BRA. PFD
operates on a small-scale, neighborhood level rather than
the citywide level. Each agency has its own bastion of
power from which it gains support.
Zoning Commission
The Zoning Commission adopts, amends and repeals zoning
regulations. The eleven member board, appointed by the Mayor
and subject to confirmation by the City Council, is
comprised of three members selected by the mayor and eight
representatives of various development related
organizations, as specified in the zoning enabling
legislation.
Actions of the Commission require a concurrent vote of
not less than seven members. Amendments are subject to the
approval by the Mayor , or a lapse of 15 days after
presentation to the Mayor, but concurrent vote of nine
members may overrule a mayoral veto.
Zoning Board of Appeal
The Zoning Board of Appeal is empowered to grant
variances, conditional uses and exceptions to the zoning
code and building code in response to requests from
applicants who have been refused permits. The Board of
Appeal consists of five members appointed by the Mayor. One
member is selected solely by the Mayor and four are
26
appointed by the Mayor from candidates nominated by
specified development-related organizations.
The South Boston Community
The South Boston Community is the neighborhood of
Boston that will be impacted the most by the Pier 4
Developemnt project. The impacts range from increased
traffic during and after construction to increased property
values as a result of the value added to the Pier 4 site.
Although the increased property values is typically viewed
as a positive externality , this occurance could have a
negative impact on the South Boston community.
Although the South Boston community is viewed by the
City as the "impacted" neighborhood, geographically, the
community is isolated from the site; it is several miles
away from the proposed project. One might argue, in fact,
that the impact from the Pier 4 project will be felt more by
Chinatown. See Exhibit 2
The median income in South Boston is currently $13,800
compared with $19,250 citywide. If property values increase,
the price attached to to the present housing stock could
become too high for long time (rental) residents to afford.
Already, South Boston is being threatened by increased
development. This could pose a problem to the South Boston
community as its strength is derived from its strong sense
of community. If the community perceives the Pier 4
project as a threat to its power structure, South Boston
27
EXHIBIT 2: Map of Surrounding Area
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could present itself as an obstacle to the development
process.
CONCLUSION
Linkage was amended into Boston's Zoning Code in 1983
when the City was experiencing enormous growth. It was a
time when developers were flocking to the City to build
high-rise office towers and residential living space.
Inclusionary housing was recently proposed by the Flynn
Administration at a time when the Dukakis Administration is
taking forward strides to address the State's housing
dilemma.
Each of the two policies impact two distict types of
development -- commercial and residential. Because the
proposed Pier 4 project is a "mixed use" project, the City
is pressuring Mariner to consider both policies. The
policies enforced by the City impose financial requirements
and development constraints on the Boston Mariner Company.
Both linkage and inclusionary housing need to be resolved
between Mariner and the City in order for Mariner to receive
its final building permit.
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CHAPTER TWO
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING REQUIREMENT
The City is requesting Mariner to set aside 50 of its
500 residential units for low to moderate income households.
Mariner can physically develop those units on site, however,
the financial implications on the project, if the units are
included on site are severe.
Throughout the analysis the following questions will
be considered in analyzing the impact of the City's
inclusionary housing requirement on the Pier 4 project: 1)
To what degree is the Pier 4 project financially less viable
because of the inclusionary housing policy? 2) How much of a
price increase on the market rate units can the market bear
in order to compensate for the loss of income incurred by
selling affordable units onsite? 3) Given the inclusionary
requirement make the Pier 4 project financially unfeasible
what alternatives are available for Mariner to consider?
The chapter begins by calculating the financial
feasibility of the inclusionary housing requirement on the
Pier 4 project. First, the cost of producing affordable
units on site will be calculated. The "cost" refers to not
only the dollar value of producing the units but also the
lost opportunities of building housing elsewhere for a
significantly lower price.
Next, once the financial gap is determined, specific
costs within the development pro forma will be varied in
order to evaluate the sensitivity of the internal costs to
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price fluctuations in the marketplace.
Table 2 sets forth the development costs for the
condominiums. The costs will be used to calculate the internal
gap created by including 50 below-market rate units on site.
The cost of the inclusionary requirement is measured by the
internal financial gap created by including below market
rate units onsite.
For the developer to achieve the same return on equity
and gross margin, the income that is lost by including 10%
below-market rate units is either passed on to the market
rate unit or foregone if the market can not absorb the
additional cost.
A financial model was used to calculate the
internal costs. Below is a step by step process of the
calculations used to determine the amount of foregone
income. The financial gap is calculated by:
1) taking the difference between the sales proceeds of
the market rate units and the sales proceeds of the
affordable units;
Market Sales Proceeds - Affordable Sales Proceeds=
Adjusted Net Proceeds
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2) The remaining sum is divided by the number of
market rate units, which yields the adjusted market rate
price;
Adjusted Net Proceeds / Market Units =
Market Price Increase
3) The adjusted market price per net square is
calculated by dividing the adjusted market price by the
gross square footage of one unit;
Adjusted Market Price / Gross Square per Unit =
Adjusted Price per Square Foot
4) The gap is calculated by taking the difference
between the adjusted and the market price per unit, times
the number of units that are on the site.
Gap = Market Price - Adjusted Market Price
Therefore, based upon the calculations it would cost
Mariner approximately $20 million or $400,000 per unit to
include 50 below market rate units on the Pier 4 site.
Although Mariner would attempt to pass on this cost to the
purchasers of its market rate units, the market might not
respond to the price increase. Increasing the price of the
market rate units by an average of $45,000 each.
The net proceeds received through selling the
condominiums are crucial to the overall viablity of the Pier
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TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT COSTS
DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA FOR PIER 4 PROJECT
ASSUMPTIONS
LAND AREA (LA) 385 994
LAND PRICE (LP) per FAR SF) $10.74
F.A.R. (FAR) 3.00
GROSS SQUARE FEET (GSF) 728,740
EFFICIENCY (EF) 807.
NET LIVING AREA (NLA) 582,992
SITE COVERAGE (SC) 751
AVG. UNIT SIZE (US)(GSF) 1457
AVG. UNIT SIZE (US)(NSF) 1166
NUMBER OF UNITS (NU) 500
PARKING RATIO (PR) I
NUMBER PKG SPACE (NPK) 500
AVG. PARKING/SP COST (APC) $25,000
CONSTRUCTION COST($/GSF)ICC) $122.50
SOFT COST (SFT) (% of HC) 31%
DEVELOPMENT COST
LAND (LC) $4,145,576
(per far/sf= $10.74
CONSTRUCTION COST(TCC) $89,270,650
SITE WORK/SUBSTRUCTURE. $20,354,130
PARKING COST $12,500,000
TOTAL HARD COST (HC) $126,270,356
CONTINGENCY @5'. HC $6,313,518
SOFT COST (SFC) $29,631,092
(as 7 of Hard Costs)(SFT) 31%
TOTAL DEVEL COST (TDC) $160,047,023
(TDC/GSF) $220
Soft Cost as % of TDC 19
CONDOMINIUM SALES PRO FORMA
-SALES PROCEEDS-
ADD 397. TO TDC (GSP) $222,465,362
SUBTRACT 5% FOR
SALES EXPENSE ($3,002,351)
NET SALES (GROSS SALES-COMM) $214,463,011
LESS TDC ($160,047,023)
GROSS PROFIT (GP) $54,415,988
EQUITY ...... 10 $16,004,702
RETURN ON SALES 25.37%
GROSS PRICE PER UNIT $444 931
GROSS PRICE PER NET SQ.FT. 1382
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4 project. The first phase of the project consists of
570,108 square feet of commercial related space and 167,820
square feet of residential space. Initially Mariner must
pay off its construction loan of approximately $62 million.
The net proceeds from the phase-one condominium sales
anticipated to be approximately $12 million, are needed to
write down the high construction costs of the commercial
square footage. If the condominiums do not sell, the
project will be financially threatened.
In addition, the carrying costs of commercial related
space could be fatal to the project if a substantial amount
of the commercial space is not (pre)leased. If Mariner is
unable to find a major tenant to fill a large portion of the
commercial use, then the weight placed on the sales of the
condominiums will increase. The net proceeds will be needed
to additionally offset Mariner's huge operating deficit.
In sum, the sales of the condominiums are crucial to
the success of the project. If the burden of the
inclusionary requirement proves to be great enough to
threaten the entire project, then the project will not take
place.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Definitions and Guidelines
Affordable housing refers to units that can be
purchased or rented by households whose incomes meet
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specific, federally established guidelines. Low income
housing is defined as housing for families earning up to 50%
of the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
median income, currently $17,000 for a family of 4, paying
no more than 30% of household income for housing. For
rental housing, this includes rent and utilities, and for
equity housing, this includes principle, interest, property
taxes, insurance and condominium fees.
Moderate income housing is defined by HUD as housing
for families earning up to 80% of the Boston's SMSA median
income, currently $27,200 for a family of four, paying no
more than 30% of a household income for housing.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) uses a
slightly broader definition for first time homeowners
participating in its housing programs. That is, housing is
considered affordable to households earning 120% of the
Boston's SMSA median income, currently $37,000 for a family
of four, paying no more than 31% of a household income for
housing. See Table 3 for a more detailed description of
these definitions and guidelines.
Affordability Analysis
In calculating the internal financial gap created by
including 10% affordable units on site, a sales price of
$73,000 was used. A sales price of $73,000 assumes that a
household purchasing a unit will be required to contribute
5% of the unit cost as a downpayment and obtain a 30 year
mortgage with a 6.5% interest rate. 2 Table 4 illustrates
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that this unit is affordable to a family of 4 at 80% of the
median income spending no more than 30% of its income on
housing.
The unit is not just limited to a family of four. Table
5 tests the affordability of the unit for specific household
sizes. Using the guidelines established by HUD, the table
shows the income required as a percentage of the median
income. For example, a family of five qualifies to purchase
the unit at $73,500 as its income is 74% of the median
income.
Table 6 illustrates the affordability of the unit at
interests rates ranging from 5.0% to 9.5%. At an interest
rate of 5% the unit would be affordable to a household
1) In support of the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, MHFA
has an active low-interest home mortgage program designed to
assist low and moderate income househholds in purchasing
their first house. MHFA makes fixed rate long-term mortgages
available at low interest rates. MHFA also offers low, five
percent downpayment requirements and underwriting limits
which generally are more liberal than those of conventional
lenders.
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TABLE 3
AFFORDABLE HOUSING - DEFINITIONS AND GUIDELINES
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 -
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
MHFA Income
Limits (Approx.
120% of Median)
$28,000
31,000
34,000
37,000
40,000
43,000
46,000
49,000
Low Income (Up
to 50% of Median)
$11,900
13,600
15,300
17,000
18,350
19,700
21,100
22,450
Moderate Income (Up
to 80% of Median)
$19,050
21,750
24,500
27,200
28,900
30,600
32,300
34,000
Median Income
(100%Median)
$23,800
27,200
30,600
34,000
36,700
39,400
42,200
44,900
$248 @ 25% GM1
283
319
354
382
410
440
468
+ GMI = Gross Monthly Income
* Maximum housing cost as x% of monthly income, in calculating possible
purchase prices, this amount must include principal, interest, taxes and
insurance and any relevant condominium fees.
37CD7/B/022786/32
Maximum Monthly
Housing Expense+
$ 298 @ 30% GMI
340
383
425
459
493
528
561
Maximum Monthly
Housing Expense+
$476 @ 30% GMI
544
613
680
723
765
808
850
Maximum Monthly
Housing Expense+
$ 595 @ 30% GM1
680
765
850.
918
985
1,055
1,123
Maximum Monthly
Housing Expense+
$ 723 @ 31% GMI
801
878
956
1,033
1,111
1,188
1,266
T ABLE 4: AFFORDABLE TO HOUSEHOLD OF FOUR
Per Year
Unit Cost (C)
Percent Mortgaged (/MTG)
Mortgage AmoLAnt (MTG)
Interest Rate (I)
Mortgage Payment (PMT)
Mortgage Insurance (INS)
Property Insurance (PINS)
Property Tax es
Term
PITI Housing Costs
Condo Fee (Condo)
Down Payment @ 5%
Total Housing Costs
30% of Median Income
Required Income
Median Income (Y)
Percent of Median Income
$73, 000
0.95
$69 ,350
6.50%
$548
0
$6, 93
$1 ,0200
$ , 133
$8, 133
$27, 110
$34, 000lo
0. 8
80 %
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TABLE 5: INCOME ELIGIBILITY BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR $73000 UNIT
Household Median
Size Income
1
2
3
4
.5
6
7
8
$23,800$27,200$30,600
$34,000
$36,700$39,400
$42,200$44,900
I of Median Income Required
to Purchase Affordable Unit
114-
1007,
89Z
80%
74%
697.
64%
607.
TABLE 6 AFFORDABILITY AT DIFFERENT INTEREST RATES
Interest Income
Rates Req'd
307
+REQ Y
0.0% $17,113
0.57. $17,725
1.01 $18,365
1.5% $19,033
2.0% $19,729
2.5% $20,452
3.07. $21,201
3.51 $21,976
4.07. $22,776
4.5% $23,599
5.07. $24,445
5.5% $25,313
6.0% $26,201
6.5% $27,110
7.07, $28,036
7.51 $28,981
8.07 $29,941
8.51 $30,918
9.0% $31,908
9.5X $32,913
10.0% $33,929
10.5% $34,958
11.0% $35,997
11.5% $37,047
12.0% $38,105
-- - - - - - - -- 
- - - --------
Income as a %
of Median Income
for Family of 4
+847
50%
54%
56%
58%
60%
62%
657
677
69%
721
74%
77%
80%
82%
85%881
01%941
97%
100%
103%
1067.
109%
112%
--- 
- - -- - - - -
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earning 72% of the median income. However, when the
interest rates increase to beyond 6.5%, the same family
would be unable to purchase the unit as its income prices
the family out of the market.
FINANCIAL / SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Based upon the costs set forth in the development
pro forma, by developing 50 below market residential units on
the Pier 4 site, a heavy financial burden is imposed not
only on the Boston Mariner Company, but also on the intended
market rate purchasers.
Table 7 illustrates how the sales price of a market
rate unit increases when an inclusionary requirement is
calculated into the pro forma costs. Without the
inclusionary requirement the sales price per unit is
$444,931. With the inclusionary requirement the sales price
per unit increases to $486,256.
Since Mariner needs to make the same returns in order
to offset the extremely high construction costs of the
commercial square footage, the difference between the market
rate unit price and the adjusted market rate price will have
to passed on to the market rate consumer. This translates
into a $41,325 price increase per unit.
Therefore, depending upon how price sensitive the
luxury condominium market is, having to increase the cost of
the unit could work against the marketability of the
condominiums. The consumer who might have purchased the unit
at the original price may not be willing to spend an
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TABLE 7: IMPACT OF INCLUSIONARY REQUIREMENT
- ON PRICE OF MARKET RATE UNIT
INCLUSIONARY REQUIREMENT
NO. OF LOW/MOD UNITS
6 MAX. MOD. INCOME
PURCHASE PRICE ALLOWED
INCOME FROM LOW/MOD UNITS
LOW/MOD PRICE PER NET SQ.FT.
NO. OF MARKET RATE UNITS
ADJ. MARKET CONDO PRICE
ADJ. PRICE PER NET SQ.FT.
GAP.....PER LOW/MOD UNIT
.TOTAL
.AS OF TDC
101
50
$73,000
$3,650,000
$63
450
$486 256
$417
$413,256
$20,662,818
13%
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additional $41,000. Especially when the increase is due to
an internal cross subsidization for affordable units.
The inclusionary requirement imposes a heavy, internal
cost on Mariner. What is not apparent through this type of
static analysis, is the sensitivity of the housing model to
fluctuations in development costs.
The Pier 4 project has a high site premium attached to
it. The engineering techniques that will be used during
construction are innovative yet expensive. Unknown site
costs are likely to occur once construction begins.
Therefore, to determine how sensitive the model would
be to cost changes within the project, sensitivity analyses
were performed on variables that are vulnerable to changes
in the development industry as well as variables associated
with the specifics of the Pier 4 project.
Construction Cost Increases
Table 8 illustrates that for every $1 per square foot
increase in construction costs, the financial gap created by
the inclusionary requirement increases incrementally by
approximately one percent. For example the construction
cost per square foot is currently $122.50. If during the
first phase of construction, unforeseen engineering problems
arise in building the underground (underwater) garage, costs
could easily increase by $5 per square foot. A price hike
such as this would cause the internal gap creeated by the
inclusionary units to increase by five percent.
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Construction Cost Decreases
Table 9 illustrates the impact on the internal gap by
reducing construction costs per square foot. This can be
seen by looking at a housing project with 500 units and an
inclusionary requirement of 10%.
By drastically reducing the construction costs per
square foot, as revealed in Table 8, the severity of the
internal costs are reduced. Whereas at a construction cost
of $122.50 per square foot, the inclusionary requirement
generates a gap of $20,662,818, or 13% of the total
development costs, at construction costs ranging between $40
to $60, the inclusionary requirement generates an average
gap of $8,189,650, accounting for 10% of the total
development cost.
Although the sensitivity table calculates the total
gap at approximately $8 million, accounting for 10% of the
total development costs, in reality the internal gap
generated by the inclusionary requirement should be smaller.
The relationship between hard and soft costs is nonlinear.
In other words, as the hard costs of a development project
decrease, the percentage of soft costs attributed to the
overall development project are proportionally less than the
percentage attributed to a project with a high site premium
such as Pier 4.
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Table 8: Impact of Construction Cost Increases
on the Price of Market Rate Units
Construction
Costs
$122
$123
$124
$125
$126
$127
$128
$129
$130
$131$132
$133$134
$135
$136$137
$138
$139
$140
Gap per
Unit
$411,536
$414,977$418,418
$421,859
$425,299
$428,740
$432,181
$435,622$439,063
$442,504
$445,945
$449,386
$452,826
$456,267
$459,708
$463,149
$466,590
$470,031
$473,472
Total 1 of Total % Change from
Gap Dev. Costs the Base Case
12.907
12.921
12.941
12.951
12.971
12.991
13.001
13.021
13.041
13.051
13.071
13.087
13.101
13.11.
13. 131
13.141
13.167
13.171
13.191
0.841
1.677
2.517
3.341
4.181
5.027
5.851
6.691
7.527
8.36%
9.20%
10.031
10.877
11.711
12.541
13. 387
14.211
15.05%
$20,576,796
$20,748,840
$20,920,884
$21,092,927
$21,264,971
$21,437,015
$21,609,058
$21,781,102
$21,953,146
$22,125,189
$22,297,233
$22,469,277
$22,641,320
$22,813,364
$22,985,408
$23,157,452
$23,329,495$23,501,539
$23,673,583
Table 9: Impact of Construction Cost Decreases
on the Price of Market Rate Units
Gap per
Unit
$129,384
$132,825$136,266
$139,707
$143,148$146,589
t150,030
$153,470
$156,911
$160,352$163,793
$167,234
$170,675
$174,116
$177,557
$180,997
$184,438
$187,879$191,320
$194,761
$198,202
Total
Gap
$6,469,213
$6,641,257$6,813,301
$6,985,344
$7,157,388
$7,329,432$7,501,476
$7,673,519
$7,845,563$8,017,607
$8,189,650
$8,361,694
$8,533,738
$8,705,781
$8,877,825
$9,049,869
$9,221,912
$9,393,956$9,566,000
$9,738,044
$9,910,087
1 of Total . Change from
Dev. Costs the Base Case
2.661
5.327.
7.987
10.647
13.301
15.967
18.621
21.281
23.931
26.591
29.251
31.911
34.571
37.231
39.891
42. 551
45.211
47.871
50.531
53.191
9.49%
9.591
9.681
9.777
9.861
9.947
10.021
10.107
10.181
10.261
10.331
10.401
10.471
10.541
10.601
10.671
10.731
10.791
10.851
10.907
10.961
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Construction
Costs
$40
$41
$42
$43
$44
$45
$46$47
$48$49
$50
$51
$52
$53
$54
$55
$56
$57
$58
$59
$60
Frequently, rehabilitation work is used as a means of
producing affordable housing. For instance, by rennovating
existing structures as a means of housing production, the
costs associated with development are reduced. This
technique is utilized because the reduced development costs
can be passed on to the unit.
It is often less expensive to undertake rehabilitating
a structure because the site is already prepared for
development. It is likely, that with a rehabilitation
project, the foundation, superstructure and walls of a
particular building are already in place. The site costs,
which typically comprise a large portion of development
costs are kept to a minimal. For Mariner, site costs
account for 20% of the total development costs. This
includes site utilities, garage service area, breakwater and
a portion of the foundation (if the foundation cost is not
all allocated to the garage).
Increase in Affordable Housing Prices
Sensitivity Table 10 illustrates that fluctuations in
the housing prices for affordable units have very little
impact on the internal gap created by an inclusionary
requirement. For example, at $73,000 per unit, the
inclusionary requirement yields a gap of $20,662,818. At
$120,000, the gap is only reduced to $18,023,929.
Therefore, an 84% price increase for an affordable unit only
yields a 12% reduction in the gap. This is because the
costs are spread across so few units.
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The price range applicable to an affordable unit is
broadly defined. While a price increase in a unit has
little effect on the internal gap created by the
inclusionary requirement, the increase in housing prices
greatly impacts the the population it is intended to serve.
As Table 11 illustrates, under the MHFA housing
affordability guidelines, a unit priced at $120,000 is
affordable to a family of 5, earning 120% of the median
income. Table 12 also reveals that under HUD guidelines, a
unit priced at $30,000 is affordable to a family of
4 earning $13,260 which is 39% of the median income. If
units were included on site and sold for the highest maximum
price attainable, then those who truely need the units, i.e.
those in the 50% to 80% median income bracket will be priced
out of the market.
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Table 10: Impact of Increasing Housing Prices
on the Price of Market Rate Units
Affordable
Housing Costs
$73,000
$75,500
$78,000
$80,500
$83,000
$85,500
$88,000
$90,500
$93,000
$95,500
$98,000
$100,500
$103,000
$105,500
$108,000
$110,500
$113,000
$115,500
$118,000
$120,500
Market
Rate
$413,256$410,479
$407,701
$404,923
$402,145
$399,367
$396,590$393,812
$391,034
$388,256
$385,479$382,701
$379,923$377,145
$374,367$371,590$368,812$366,034
$363,256
$360,479
Total
Ba p
$20,662,818
$20,523,929
$20,385,040
$20,246,151
$20,107,262
$19,968,374
$19,829,485
$19,690,596
$19,551,707
$19,412,818
$19,273,929
$19,135,040
$18,996,151
$18,857,262
$18,718,374
$18,579,485
$18,440,596
$18,301,707
$18,162,818
$180231929
.Of Total X Change from
Dev. Costs the Base Case
12.917.
12.821 -0.671
12.741 -1.341
12.651 -2.021
12.561 -2.691
12.481 -3.361
12.391 -4.031
12.301 -4.711
12.227 -5.387
12.131 -6.057
12.041 -6.721
11.967 -7.391
11.871 -8.071
11.781 -8.74.
11.701 -9.411
11.611 -10.087
11.521 -10.751
11.441 -11.431
11.351 -12.101
11.261 -12.77%
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TABLE 11: INCOME ELISB ILITY BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR $120,000 UNIT
-------------------===================--------
Household Median
Size Income
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
$23,800
$27,200$30,600
$34,000
$36,700$39,400$42,200
$44,900
% of Median Income Required
to Purchase Affordable Unit
178%
155%
1381
1241
115%
107%
100
94%
TABLE 12: INCOME ELIGIBILITY BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR $35,000 UNIT
Household Median
Size Income
1
2
7
4
5
6
7
8
I of Median Income Required
to Purchase Affordable Unit
$23,800$27,200
$30,600
$34,000$36,700
$39,400$42,200
$44,900
621
551
491
44%
411
381
351
331
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MARKET RISKS
Site Context
Even a superficial market study of the Fort Point
Channel area reveals that Mariner's development project
faces many risks. The risks associated with the site are
easy to identify; clearly Mariner is the pioneer developer
of an underutilized section of Boston.
First, Atlantic Avenue, the Central Artery and the
Channel itself are expansive visual barriers. How likely
is someone to purchase a luxury condominium if the
surrounding area is unpleasing? Second, the properties
adjacent to and surrounding the area of the site are also
visually unappealing. Third, the infrastructure of the Fort
Point Channel area which includes bridges and roads are in
very poor condition. In sum, not only is the present
context of the site unattractive, but accessibility to and
from the site is hampered by deteriorating infrastructure.
Although the City and State continually assure
landowners with investments at risk that infrastructure
improvements will be made to the area, assurance is not
always translated into action. Actual improvements need to
take place in order for the section of town to be recognized
as a viable alternative for living and work space.
The Housing Market
The condominium market also poses serious threats to
Mariner. Over the past two years Boston's condominium
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EXHIBIT 3: Site Context
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market has experienced a great deal of activity. According
to a study done for Mariner by Pannell Kerr Forster (PKF),
3,100 condominiums in Boston were sold in 1985. The average
price per square foot was approximately $135, a twenty-five
percent increase from the previous year. The average unit
size was 900 square feet.
Although the condominium sale statistics are
comforting, the units that are being produced by Mariner do
not fit into the "average" description previously mentioned.
Mariner is targeting the upper income consumer. The units
the firm are marketing are oversized and the average square
footage sales prices are projected to be $350 to $430 per
net square foot, depending upon the phase, and comparable
with other luxury projects in association with hotels such
as the Ritz, Four Seasons, and Rowes Wharf.
Mariner's product is positioned in the market for the
upper income consumer. Households that fall into this
category have very specific demands. The quality, location,
amenities and services offered by the developer are
critical factors in determining the marketability of a unit.
Also, those purchasing units would want assurance that there
is a great potential for price appreciation.
The area that presently caters towards the clientele
above includes the Back Bay, Beacon Hill, South End, and the
downtown Waterfront. However, most of the development
opportunities in the aforementioned areas are gone. The
supply of units in those areas is relatively fixed and land
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for luxury units is decreasing.
As the demand for luxury condominiums continue to
grow, the Fort Point Channel area is a logical place for
development to occur. However success in the market for
Mariner will be dependent upon many factors.
First, the City's and State's must be able to deliver
it promises regarding infrastructure improvements. If these
improvements are not made, the willingness of people to pay
top price for a project encumbered with physical and visual
eyesores may be less than projected.
Second, if the condominium market softens, Mariner
will be directly hit. Mariner could end up competing
against many other developments much like itself. In fact,
the adjacent property being developed by HBC will offer 600
luxury condominiums over three years. In addition to
Mariner's 100 luxury condominiums, it is questionable if the
market is ready to absorb 350 luxury condominiums in one
location in one year.
Opportunity Costs
From an economic standpoint, the opportunity cost of
building affordable units on the site is severe. What is
most significant about the gap created by the inclusionary
requirement is not the amount of money generated by the
inclusionary requirement but rather the lost opportunity of
building a greater number of affordable units elsewhere
equal to the value of the gap.
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At the expense of producing 50 affordable units on
site, Mariner must substantially increase the cost of market
rate units. If the value of the gap were used on its own to
develop affordable housing, $20 million unleveraged could
produce 250 units. This assumes the unit costs $80,000 to
build.
By looking at a less costly project, the impact of the
requirement is not as severe. In fact, as illustrated in
Table 13, the internal costs of an inclusionary requirement
of 20% on a project with construction costs of $60.00 per
square foot, is equal to Mariner's gap. Therefore, at half
the construction cost, twice as many units could be built.
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TABLE 13: OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Impact of Inclusionary Requirement and Construction Costs on the Total Gap
Const.--osts--2-----------------------
Const. Costs 51 10% 15% 201 25%. 30% 3451
$40 $3,064,364
$45 $3,471,836
$50 $3,879,308
$55 $4,286,780
$60 $4,694,252
$65 $5,101,724
$70 $5,509,196
$75 $5,916,668
$80 $6,324,139
$85 $6,731,611
$90 $7,139,083
$95 $7,546,555
$100 $7,954,027
$105 $8,361,499
$110 $8,768,971
$115 $9,176,443
$120 $9,583,915
$125 $9,991,387
$130 $10,398,858
$135 $10,806,330
$6,469,213
$7,329,432
$8,189,650
$9,049,869
$9,910,087
$10,770,306
$11,630,524
$12,490,743
$13,350,961
$14,211,180
$15,071,398
$15,931,616
$16,791,835
$17,652,053
$18,512,272
$19,372,490
$20,232,709
$21,092,927
$21,953,146
$22,813,364
$10,274,633
$11,640,862
$13,007,092
$14,373,321
$15,739,550
$17,105,780
$18,472,009
$19,838,238
$21,204,468
$22,570,697
$23,936,926
$25,303,156
$26,669,385
$28,035,614
$29,401,844
$30,768,073
$32,134,302
$33,500,532
$34,866,761
$36,232,990
$14,555,730
$16,491,222
$18,426,713
$20,362,205
$22,297,696
$24,233,188
$26,168,679
$28,104,171
$30,039,662
$31,975,154
$33,910,646
$35,846,137
$37,781,629
$39,717,120
$41,652,612
$43,588,103
$45,523,595
$47,459,086
$49,394,578
$51;330,069
$19,407,640
$21,988,296
$24,568,951
$27,149,606
$29,730,262
$32,310,917
$34,891,573
$37,472,228
$40,052,883
$42,633,539
$45,214,194
$47,794,849
$50,375,505
$52,956,160
$55,536,816
$58,117,471
$60,698,126
$63,278,782
$65,859,437
$68,440,093
$24,952,680 $31,350,803
$28,270,666 $35,519,554
$31,588,651 $39,688,305
$34,906,637 $43,857,056
$38,224,622 $48,025,807
$41,542,608 $52,194,558
$44,860,593 $56,363,309
$48,178,579 $60,532,060
$51,496,564 $64,700,811
$54,814,550 $68;869,562
$58,132,535 $73,038,313
$61,450;521 $77,207,064
$64,768,506 $81,375,815
$68,086,492 $85,544,566
$71,404,477 $89,713,317
$74,722,463 $93,882,068
$78,040;448 $98,050,820
$81,358,434 $102,219,571
$84,676,419 $106,388,322
$87,994,405 $110,557,073
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the impact
and determine the financial feasibilty of the inclusionary
requirement on the Pier 4 project. Based upon the findings
set forth it is apparent that the size of the development
project, the building costs, and the housing and commercial
mix, influence the finacial impact of an inclusionary
requirement.
The inclusionary requirement imposed upon Mariner
creates a financial drain that must be absorbed within the
project. The condominiums are an intregal part of the
commercial uses, both physically and economically. The net
proceeds from the condominium sales are needed to offset the
extremely high construction costs of the commercial footage.
Given that a leaseup deficit is likely to occur, the
proceeds from the condominiums are even more crucial.
Therefore, unless the the condominiums are successful, the
entire project may not take place.
Presently, without taking into account the
inclusionary requirement, the condominium portion of the
project will generate a 25.37% return on sales. With the
inclusionary requirement, Mariner must increase the price of
the market units by $41,325 to achieve the identical 25%
return on sales. Increasing the sales price on the market
rate units could present major problems to the marketability
of the units. Although it is impossible to determine how
much of the internal costs generated by developing units on
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site will be absorbed by the market, predictions can be made
by looking at economic trends and then extrapolating into
the future.
The market risks facing the project could present
problems for Mariner. If the market softens, Mariner risks
neither selling the units required nor leasing a sufficient
amount of space. If the market softens and Mariner
increases the prices of the market rate units, this may
further aggrevate the marketability of the product.
Without adjusting the prices of the market rate units
to compensate for the lost income generated by the
inclusionary requirement, Mariner's return on net sales
would be reduced to 17.4%. At this rate of return, Mariner
would be unable to obtain condominium financing from a
conventional lending institution.
Therefore the inclusionary requiremnt exacerbates the
market risks that confront Mariner. However, regardless of
the inclusionary requirement the market risks are factors
that Mariner must contend with -- irrespective of city
policies. The assessment of the risks are in Mariner's hand
-- only the firm can make the "go ahead" decision.
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CHAPTER THREE
BOSTON MARINER'S LINKAGE REQUIREMENT
In accordance with the Development Impact Project
agreement Boston Mariner is obligated to pay to the City of
Boston, for a twelve year period, (on an annual basis),
$436,476. Mariner can either give its money to a trust fund
or use the payment as equity or gap financing for the
production of affordable housing in Boston.
Diagram 1 illustrates the two options Mariner must
choose between to satisfy its linkage requirement. The
housing creation option (HCO) requires Mariner to go through
a structured review process while the Neighborhood Trust
Fund (NTF) involves one step - transferring the exaction to
the Fund on an annual basis.
What is not revealed within Diagram 1 are the
political, financial, and managerial issues associated with
each option. Diagram 2 sets the stage to take these
concerns into account. However, the decision that Mariner
must make regarding its linkage obligation is far more
complex than either chart can illustrate. Diagram 2
establishes three additional tiers of decisions that a
developer must undertake when faced with a linkage
requirement. Each decision, whether it be between the HCO
or NTF, or selling or renting the units, poses specific
questions. Each question raises critical issues. This
chapter discusses the questions and the issues.
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LINKAGE OPTIONS and HOUSING CREATION PROCESS
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT PROJECT
EXACTION AGREEMENT
REVIEW BY HOUSING
POCICY GROUP
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To make its final decision between the HCO and
the NTF, Mariner needs to determine the political and
economic, and the time value of each route and the
tradeoffs that exist among them. Does the City care how
Mariner satisfies its linkage obligation as long as the City
receives its money? What is the potential opposition from
the South Boston community if Mariner chooses to give money
to the NTF? Exactly how influential is the South Boston
community in terms of Mariner gaining its final building
approval? In sum, will the path taken by Mariner influence
the rate at which the firm receives its final approval from
the City?
This chapter will explore the political consequences,
administrative issues, and financial implications that
Mariner faces in choosing any of these options to satisfy
its linkage obligation. The first section of the chapter
focuses on the Neighborhood Trust Fund, and the second
section centers on the Housing Creation Option.
THE NEIGHBORHOOD TRUST FUND
Through the DIP agreement, Mariner can satisfy its
linkage obligation by contributing its exaction, on a yearly
basis, to the Neighborhood Trust Fund (NTF). The Fund is a
Massachusetts public charitable trust created under the laws
of the Commonwealth on November 19, 1985. Presently, there
is $1.00 in the Fund.
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Originally, when the White administration established
linkage in 1983, the funds collected were to:
1. be administered by the Neighborhood Trust;
2. be used to expand the supply of decent housing for
low and moderate income households;
3. support housing initiatives of community
development organizations;
4. assist initiatives of public private partnerships;
5. complement city housing programs and policies.
In essence, the funds were to be used to increase the supply
of affordable housing in Boston's neighborhoods. Funding
would be "released in the form of both grants and loans to
subsidize the financing, construction, rehabilitation,
management, maintanance and operation of low and moderate
income housing". (Mayors Report on Linkage, pg. 22, 1983)
As it stands today, the Flynn administration promises
to carry out the goals for the NTF, which were established
in the White administration. Presently, $53 million is
earmarked for the Fund, however formal plans do not exist
regarding the use of the money.
For Mariner, contributing money to the Neighborhood
Trust Fund is the most straightforward option for the firm
to take in satisfying its linkage requirement. Payments
would be made annually for twelve years. Mariner would
simply write an annual check for $436,437 to the City of
Boston which would then allocate the money to housing
developers for the production of affordable housing. Once
the money is in the City's hands, Mariner has no control
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over its usage. The firm does not need to think about its
linkage payment until it is due the following year.
Financial Implications: A Net Present Value Analysis
Mariner's linkage payment totals $5,586,432. While
the amount is substantial, the overall payment is worth a
lot less today than the $5.586 million figure. Each year, as
Mariner transfers its payment to the NTF, the value of the
money decreases over time.
Table 14 illustrates how the value of the money
diminishes. By taking the present value of each payment,
discounting the money at 10%, the total NPV1 of Mariner's
$5,586,432 equals $3,271,121, or $3.50 per square foot. 2
In the short run Mariner's linkage payment is a
financial burden on the firm; however, as each phase of the
project is complete the impact of the payment becomes less
significant. The declining impact of the linkage payment on
Mariner is a function of increased revenues from the project
and the diminishing value of the exaction over time.
--- ----------- ------ ---------------------------------
1) The Net Present Value is the sum of a stream of future
cash flows discounted back to the present to take into
account the time value of money.
2) In actuality, the NPV of the total annuity will be less
than the quoted figure. The discounted value of the linkage
payment was calculated assuming Mariner begins payment
today. It is most likely that Mariner will not begin payment
until 1988. In this case the value of the payment stream
would be $2,457,642.
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TABLE 14
NET PRESENT VALUE OF
FUTURE PAYMENTS OF
$5,586,432
@ 10%
YEAR AMOUNT
Year 1 $436,437
Year 2 360,691
Year 3 327,902
Year 4 289,092
Year 5 270,993
Year 6 246,357
Year 7 223,961
Year 8 203,601
Year 9 185,092
Year 10 168,265
Year 11 152,969
Year 12 139,062
TOTAL $3,271,121
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For example, in the first phase of the project 737,982
square feet of space will be developed. Each use -
condominium, parking and commercial, will generate income on
an annual basis. Moreover, based upon specific escalating
factors3 the income received from tenants will generate a
cash flow for Mariner that will increase annually.
Therefore, as Mariner's cash flow increases per year,
and the present value of the linkage payment decreases
annually, the impact of the linkage payment on the overall
project will be less significant than in the earlier phases.
From the City's perspective, the impact of the
declining value of the linkage payment is the exact
opposite. Each year the linkage payment will have less
buying power in the housing market.
For example, assume Mariner has a linkage payment of
$100,000 per year for twelve years. Mariner can use these
funds to write down the cost of five units so that a family
of four, earning 80% of the median income, could purchase
the unit.
If the unit costs $85,000 to build but must be sold
for $65,000 in order for the household of four to afford it,
Mariner can use its $100,000 to bring the cost down to an
affordable level. However, if construction costs increase
at 4%, an identical unit would now cost $99,438.
----------------------------------------------------
3) Mariner has incorporated the following escalating
factors into its pro forma: Commercial rents 4%; Parking
7%; and Condominiums 12%.
64
Mariner's linkage payment could bring the price down to
$79,000. It is now questionable whether the same family
could purchase the unit.
Political Issues
Mariner would like to see its linkage funds go towards
the development of affordable housing in South Boston.
However, as mentioned earlier, once Mariner gives the City
its money, it loses control over its usage.
Losing control over the money raises an important
issue. Will Mariner lose its bargaining position with the
City and the South Boston community by choosing to
contribute to the NTF? If Mariner elects to satisfy its
linkage requirement through the NTF, can Mariner request
that the funds be directed towards the South Boston
community, and will the City promise to honor its
(Mariner's) request? Or does Mariner, by choosing this
option, relinquish all powers to directly assist the South
Boston community? The answers to these questions are
critical.
One reason to be skeptical over where the money will
go and how the money will be spent is that the
administrative body for the NTF is not yet established.
There is much debate among the Mayor's staff, the City
Council and the BRA regarding usage and administration of
the funds. According to Mariner, Steven Coyle has suggested
that through a letter of agreement between Mariner and the
BRA, the firm can direct a portion of the funds to South
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Boston.
From a policy standpoint, one of the major
disagreements focuses on "who" or "what" should benefit from
the fund. For example, it is unclear whether the funds
should be used to target specific income levels,
rehabilitate the existing housing stock or serve as "gap"
financing for projects that would otherwise be unfeasible?
From an administrative point of view, the seven member
council that will form the NTF administrative body is not
established. Once again, debate exists among the Mayor's
Staff, the BRA and the City Council as to who should sit on
the committee, which agency should administer the funds, and
what its role should be.
Based upon the status of the NTF, the likelihood of
Mariner having much control over where and how the money
will be spent, and thereby gaining political leverage, is
highly doubtful. Therefore, it is necessary for Mariner to
determine how responsive the South Boston community will be
if Mariner transfers money to the NTF without any promises
to the South Boston community.
THE HOUSING CREATION OPTION
The housing creation option (HCO) is broadly defined.
According to Bill Whitman, Chief Legal Advisor at the BRA,
the guidelines, which are still in draft form, are
intentionally vague to encourage developers to be innovative
deal makers. Through the housing creation option Mariner has
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several development vehicles through which it can satisfy
its linkage obligation.
First, Mariner can directly create affordable housing.
This can be accomplished through new construction,
acquistion/rehabilitation, or through the purchase of
existing structures.
Second, the Boston Mariner Company can form a joint
venture, general or limited partnership or similar
corporate relationship with a Minority Business Enterprise
(MBE), Community Development Corporation (CDC), or for-profit
or non-profit organization in order to create affordable
housing.
Third, Mariner can contribute the Net Present Value
(NPV) of its payment stream that would have been made under
the housing payment option to an entity designated by the
developer and approved by the BRA. The payment stream would
be discounted at a "blended" rate. The rate is equal to one
half the rate at which the City borrows money plus one half
the rate at which a developer borrows money from a
commercial lender. The designated development entity would
be responsible for the construction and operation of the
units.
Fourth, Mariner can select any of the options
above or any combination of the options above in full or
partial satisfaction of its obligations under the DIP
agreement.
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If Mariner chooses the housing creation option, a
development proposal must be submitted and reviewed by a
housing policy group. The housing policy group is to
specifically evaluate housing proposals submitted by
developers in satisfying linkage obligations. Although the
housing policy group has yet to be formed, a top BRA
official believes that the group will consist of BRA staff
housing specialists.
Following the submission of the housing proposal,
recommendations from the housing policy group will be made
to the BRA which will either approve, or reject the
proposal or send the proposal back to the developer for
further modifications. If the project is approved, then the
developer enters into a Housing Creation agreement with the
BRA. Once this is accomplished, construction of the housing
can begin.
In sum, the options available to Mariner are many.
Although the final approval for a deal rests in the hands of
the BRA, Mariner is free to produce rental property or
sell the units outright. It can build housing on its own,
joint venture with a community group and/or developer, or
designate their stream of linkage payments to a housing
developer who will then use the funds towards the production
of affordable housing.
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What follows is a discussion of the issues that
surround each development alternative. The section will
begin with a discussion of the political costs and benefits
of building in South Boston rather than in another
neighborhood of the City. The next part is an analysis of
the financial costs and benefits of producing rental and
for-sale units. Special consideration will be paid to the
issues of property management and resale restrictions. The
final section will discuss the implications of Mariner
developing housing on rather than with a community group.
The overriding issue in analyzing which option is most
appropriate for Mariner, is which choice will give Mariner
the most political leverage in the development arena. The
questions are identical to those posed earlier in the
section under the NTF scenario. Whether the NTF or HCO
route is chosen, Mariner must determine how the decision
will impact its relationship with the city and the South
Boston community.
A Profile of South Boston
Throughout the dialogue of this thesis, the issues of
influence and control over the South Boston community come
into play. Although it is difficult to ascertain the level
of power the neighborhood could exercise over the outcome
of the project, the potential of neighborhood opposition
exists. Any possible threat should not be overlooked.
In order to involve the South Boston community in the
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planning and development phase of the Pier 4 project, the
City created the Fan Pier /Pier 4 Civic Advisory Committee
(CAC) to serve as a liason between the city and the
developer, on behalf of the community. The sole purpose of
the CAC is to make certain that the concerns of the
community are integrated into the planning process.
According to the leaders of South Boston, the
community is concerned with "maintaining its way of life."
Sixty-three percent of the people living in South Boston
have lived there for at least 30 years. The residents
firmly believe in the extended family; the family belongs
together in the neighborhood. Residents have a strong sense
of territory and will protect it.
However, South Boston's tradition of proud
parochialism is being threatened by political and economic
forces from within the City. Over the past two years,
housing and commercial real estate development in South
Boston experienced a profound change. According to the BRA,
last year "105 condominium deeds were filed for South Boston
compared with 28 in 1984 and three in 1982. Mayor Flynn, a
native of South Boston is urging "unity and cooperation" for
all Boston neighborhoods. In South Boston, this policy is
being met with defiance.
City Councilor James Kelly recently remarked that "the
people of South Boston have strong suspicions and
resentments. We don't have short memories. If we don't
protect ourselves, no one else will. That was the mentality
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of Southie 30 years ago and it still is. I hope the Irish
sense of "us and them" will always be there." Kelly
contined to state that he is "convinced South Boston will
continue to be worth fighting for as long as we can control
our destiny and stick together". (Boston Globe 7/30 Ethan
Bronner)
Although these sentiments of "mistrust", "territorial"
and "us - them" may not represent everyone's feelings in
South Boston, these attitudes are felt by a majority of
South Boston residents. These sentiments are not unique to
South Boston. Many of Boston's neighborhoods are
territorial. Many are threatened by outsiders. This
ideology is a long established fact in Boston, and a
difficult fabric to unravel.
If South Boston is ready to "fight" for its "control"
and destiny over its neighborhood, where does the Boston
Mariner company stand in light of these circumstances.
Would the South Boston community want housing built in its
neighborhood knowing that people from other sections of town
could possibly "move in" to the neighborhood? Does Mariner
want to be associated with breaking up the fabric of a well
established community?
On the other hand, if the community is threatened by
housing developers renovating the aged housing stock and
selling the units at a premium, could Mariner assist the
community in gaining control over vacant lots and
dilapidated housing strucures, before the neighborhood is
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gentrified?
Develop Alone or with a Partner
If Mariner chooses to develop housing on its own, it
must first identify an appropriate site. The criteria under
which it selects a site will based upon cost and location.
From a cost standpoint Mariner must obtain land from either
the City, State or private land owner for $1. Based upon
recent development projects in the City, Mariner should be
able to obtain a land subsidy from the City. In terms of
location, if Mariner chooses to build, the firm would prefer
to do so in South Boston.
Although it is fair to assume that Mariner could
receive land from the City or State, the likelihood of this
happening soon is questionable. To begin with, the
disposition of public land does not typically take the form
of a "sole source designation".
A sole source designation occurs when the City awards
a developer a site, without offering it to other developers.
Typically, when the City wishes to release a parcel of land
for development, it sends out a Request for Proposal (RFP)
to appropriate developers. Only after all proposals are
submitted to the City and reviewed, will a developer be
chosen and awarded a site. Seldom does a developer submit a
development proposal to the City and then awarded a site.
Secondly, Mariner can not rely heavily on the BRA to
identify a site for the firm in South Boston. This is
because most of the City owned land in South Boston is
72
controlled by the Public Facilities Department (PFD). At
this point it is difficult to determine how willing PFD will
be to negotiate with Mariner.
The second option available to Mariner if it chooses
to build housing, but not as the main developer, is to join
forces with an established housing group. The development
team could be a for-profit, non-profit or a minority
business organization based in South Boston or elsewhere in
the City. The most likely candidate for Mariner
to connect with would be a community development
corporation specializing in housing development, located in
South Boston.
Mariner has much to gain by working with a CDC. First,
if the group is from the South Boston community, the
organization
South Boston
support from
If the
then Mariner
In addition,
will be able
of the City.
could serve as a liason between Mariner and the
neighborhood. The CDC will be able to marshall
within the community in favor of the project.
CDC is well-seasoned in the field of housing,
's role as a partner could be kept to a minimum.
by working with a local, experienced CDC they
to work within and around the bureaucracy
This includes knowing what financial subsidies
are available for housing and the agencies which sponsor
them, as well as knowing which public agencies control what
parcels of land. By creatively using linkage money in
conjunction with state and local funding, more below-market
rate units can be produced.
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The flip side of this arguement is if Mariner selects
a community group to work with wishing to keep a low
profile, and for one reason or another, the project in which
they are financially committed to, fails Mariner runs the
risk of being associated with a bad deal. In addition
Mariner may feel compelled to "save" the project if they see
their reputation on the line. This translates into
additional time and energy that the developer may not have.
Rental versus Sales
In order to explore the issues that would arise if
Mariner elects to develop housing on its own, this section
will explore the implications of producing rental and for
sale units. The section will focus on three aspects of the
development process: finance, management and marketing.
Management
Mariner's level of involvement in property management
is contingent upon the type of product it delivers to the
market and the level of involvement and control the firm
wishes to hold. The firm must question its ambitions as
office developers; Is Mariner ready, willing and able to
diversify within the development industry?
Assume that Mariner will develop rental property on
its own. Under this scenario, Mariner can set up a
management structure in one of three ways. First, Mariner
can hire a property management firm to to maintain the
project. Second, Mariner can manage the property on its
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own, and third, Mariner can designate a tenant from the
property to take on the responsibility.
The first structure -- hiring a management firm,
raises issues of trust and capabilities. What criteria does
Mariner use in selecting a management company? Does Mariner
choose a group such as GBCD, Urban Edge, or a local CDC, all
of which are driven by "missions" to encourage housing and
community development. If Mariner hires a firm, the firm
will most likely be viewed as an extension of Mariner.
Therefore, the management company would have to be competent
and reliable.
The second strucure -- managing the property on its
own, raises issues of time and commitment. If Mariner
accepts the responsibility of managing the property, Mariner
runs the risk of not being able to appropriately service the
clients on the smaller scale, "affordable" project. If
Mariner's in-house management firm is kept busy servicing
the residents of the Pier 4 project, the "linkage" related
project may be pushed aside and tended to only after the
Pier 4 clients are properly serviced. Neglect of the housing
project could become self-perpetuating resulting in a
failing property. If the project fails Mariner would risk
being labeled a negligent landlord. This type of publicity
could only hinder Mariner.
The third structure suggested -- hiring someone who
lives in the building, is the most logical yet risky
response to the management dilemna. By hiring one of the
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tenants to serve as property manager, a sense of pride in
the property may be instilled in all the residents. However,
if the person is neither responsible nor available to the
other residents, then the overall maintenance of the
property could begin to deteriorate. Once again,
deterioration of the property could become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
If Mariner finds that it is more sensible from an
economic and management perspective to sell the units
outright, then the firm must once again decide between the
product type. Specifically, should the units be sold as
condominiums or housing cooperatives. In addition Mariner
must establish specific resale restrictions for the units in
order to keep the units affordable to buyers and or renters
for a specified amount of time.
Marketing
Below-market rate housing is a highly marketable
product in Boston. The demand is high yet the supply is
low. Therefore, disposing the units will not present
problems to Mariner; however, the manner in which the units
are allocated to prospective buyers/renters needs to be
carefully planned.
One of the City's most unique characteristics is the
sense of pride instilled in Boston's neighborhoods. Many
neighborhoods, whether it be in South Boston, Roxbury, or
Charlestown can be catagorized as extended families. Many
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neighborhoods would prefer to have its own residents fill
vacancies and new homes that come on to the market, while
other neighborhoods encourage ethnic and socio-economic mix.
Though desiring to have your "own kind" on the block
may be socially accepted within certain neighborhoods, this
type of action is viewed as discriminatory. As history
reveals, neighborhood "preference" can be legally
challenged.
This past March the Bricklayers & Laborers Non-Profit
Housing Company, Inc. completed the construction of 18 brick
rowhouses on Dorchester Street in South Boston. Through a
land subsidy of $1 given to the Bricklayers by the Public
Facilities Department and union members performing work for
time and materials only -- no profit, the Bricklayers were
able to sell the units at an affordable price of $70,000 to
South Boston residents.
By specifically targeting the units to South Boston
residents, the Bricklayers were accused by the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) of discrimination.
MCAD filed a charge against the bricklayers for limiting the
participation in the upcoming lottery for units to only
South Boston residents. It was found that since only 15
residents in South Boston are black, the South Boston only
designation for the project did indeed have a discriminatory
effect.
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There was much publicity centering around the
Bricklayer case for weeks to follow. A Boston Globe
editorial mentioned that "few nonwhite Bostonians may want
to live in a nearly all white neighborhood. But that is not
the point." As MCAD chairman Alex Rodriguez commented, "the
point is access. This agreement guarantees access by
requiring that the units be heavily advertised in minority
dominated areas. (Globe Editorial, March 21, 1986)
The issue of housing discrimination in Boston is
timely. Presently the Mayor is proposing a fair housing plan
to allow up to 70% neighborhood preference in publically
assisted housing. The fair housing plan is an attempt by
the Flynn administration to prevent displacement of
neighborhood residents when affordable housing units are
built. This proposal is being challenged by MCAD as an
"unacceptable" part of the City's plan.
In order to prevent a repeat episode, similar to the
Bricklayers, Mariner will need to establish rental and/or
ownership guidelines to clarify the manner in which tenants
and owners will be chosen. The plan must comply with the
Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action standards in
accordance with the Mayor's plan.
Financial Analysis
This section will analyze the financial feasibility of
developing affordable housing units through the housing
creation option. This section is to be viewed as an initial
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feasibility study; it is a study to determine ways in which
linkage money can be used to develop affordable housing.
Though the examples that follow are hypothetical, the
assumptions used are realistic.
The feasibility study will investigate two methods
through which Mariner can leverage its linkage payment to
develop affordable housing. The linkage payment can be used
as an equity contribution for a rental project or to
write down the purchase price of a for-sale unit. These are
only two of the many development scenarios that exist for
Mariner.
Rental Property
Mariner's linkage money must go towards the production
of affordable housing. The rental analysis evaluates the
extent to which the money can be spent to produce below-
market rate units. Three examples follow which incorporate
different income mixes. A discounted cash flow analysis will
be used to evaluate each income mix. In addition the
analysis will look at the effects of the proposed senate tax
reforms. In all three rental cases, Mariner will use its
first year linkage payment as an equity contribution.
The financial analysis of the rental property assumes
that Mariner will obtain a 30 Year conventional mortgage at
10.5%. Though Mariner could probably obtain more favorable
terms from MHFA or through various rental subsidy programs
sponsored by EOCD, the firm has neither the staffing nor
expertise to to creatively package its debt structure.
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Rental Analysis
Income mix 1 assumes that all units will be
afffordable to household earning up to 80% of the median
income. Based on the development assumptions and costs,
this investment would yield a .22% internal rate of return
(IRR) and a Net Present Value at 10% (NPV) of ($267,107).
Income mix 2 assumes that 25% of the units will be
affordable to households earning 80% of the median income.
The remaining 75% of the units will be affordable to
households earning 120% of the median income. Based upon
the development costs of the project and the potential gross
income that the project will generate, this investment will
yield an IRR of 7.64% and a NPV at 10% of ($57,923).
Income mix 3 assumes that 50% of the units will be
affordable to households earning 80% of the median income,
10% of the units will be affordable to households earning
120% of the median income and the remaining 40% will be
affordable to households whose incomes are in excess of 120%
of the median income. Based upon the development costs of
the project and the potential gross income that the project
will generate, this investment yields an IRR of 9.2% and a
NPV of ($20,266).
Table 15 summarizes the three examples indicating the
amount of debt each project will be able to carry, the
mortgage value, the loan to value ratio of each investment
and the return measures. The table reveals that regardless
of the income mix the projects are not financially feasible
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for Mariner to undertake.
TABLE 15: SUMMARY SHEET OF RENTAL PROJECTS
MIX I MIX 2 MIX 3
Equity $449,970 $458,481 $423,421
Mtg. Value $591,982 $1,268,001 $1,303,305
Debt Service $58,372 $140,150 $144,052
Loan:Value Ratio 571 731 75A
NPV @ 101 ($267,107) ($57,923) ($20,266)
IRR 0.22Z 7.647 9.21
The low return measures are due to the fact that all
projects are negatively leveraged. Negative leverage exists
when the return on total capital and return on equity is
less than the rate at which Mariner can borrow money from
the bank. Therefore, whatever net operating income is
earned by the project, the majority of it is going back to
the bank to service the debt rather than going to the
developer.
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Assuming Senate Tax Changes
In the past developers were able to successfully
syndicate real estate projects by selling tax shelters
through limited partnerships. Now with a new tax bill soon
to go into effect the extent to which losses from passive
activities may be used to reduce tax liability with respect
to income derived from nonpassive activities will diminish.
Much of the low income housing that was developed over
the past ten years took advantage of these tax benefits.
Now, with a new tax bill soon to go into effect, the tax
advantages associated with syndicated properties will
disappear and the production of affordable housing will
decline.
A new incentive is presently being proposed to assist
in the production of low-income housing; the incentive is a
tax credit. The amount of the credit is claimed annually
for a period of ten years. The amount of the credit is
equal to 8% of the basis attributable to low income housing
units and 4% of the basis attributable to moderate income
housing units.
The amount of the tax credit attributed to units
occupied by individuals with incomes between 50% to 70% of
the area median income may not exceed 30% of the number of
units in the development. At least 20% of the residential
units in all buildings must be occupied by low income
households.
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In order to determine the impact of the proposed tax
changes on the development of affordable housing, the credit
was applied accordingly to Mix 1 through 3. Since the three
examples were primarily targeted towards moderate income
households the income mixes were adjusted.
The analyses reveal that while the devlopment
opportunities are not feasible under the present tax
conditions using the proposed tax changes positively effect
the investment opportunities for below-market rate housing.
In fact the tax credit makes it viable to rent units to low
income households.
Table 16 illustates the impact the tax credit has on
the financial feasibility of developing below market rate
units. What was once economically unfeasible is now worth
considering as an investment opportunity.
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TABLE 16: SUMMARY SHEET OF RENTAL PROJECTS
(INCLUDING PROPOSED TAX CHANGES)
MIX 4 MIX 5 MIX 6
Equity $433,348 $423,421 $433,348
Mtg. Value $980,729 $1,303,305 $980,729
Debt Service $108,398 $144,052 $108,398
Loan:Value Ratio 69% 75% 69%
NPV @ 10% $36,330 $124,422 $342,800
IRR 11.50% 15.31 23.02%
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For-Sale
The for-sale scenario is far less complex than the
rental project. This example illustrates how Mariner can
use its linkage payment to write down the cost of a unit so
it may be affordable to a household of 4 earning 80% of the
median income. The example assumes that Mariner will work
with a community group and apply its payment to a project
either under construction or to a project that is in the
pipeline.
Based on the development cost pro forma set forth in
Table 17, the sales price per unit is $84,333. If Mariner
were to take its linkage money and apply the money directly
to to the development costs, the price of the unit could be
reduced to $69,785 which would be affordable to a household
of 4 earning 80% of the median income. A deeper subsidy
could make less units available but targeted towards a lower
income group.
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TABLE 17: COST PRO FORMA FOR FOR-SALE UNITS
Number of Units
ACQUISITION
HARD COSTS:
Construction Costs
Site Preparation
Landscape
Facade
Bondi ng
TOTAL HARD COSTS
HC per Unit
SOFT COSTS
.23% of HC
CONTINGENCY
$1,350.,000
r$227 0 , 00)
$70 ,000O
$240 ,000
$28,950
$1,953,950
$65,293
:$450, 559
$15,019
$120,475
$2,529,984TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Total COST PER UNIT
Development Contributions
MARINER's Linkage
Revised Development Cost
TOTAL COST PER UNIT
$436,437
$2,093,547
$69,785
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CONCLUSIONS
When a developer enters into a DIP agreement with the
City, the developer is given many options through which it
can satisfy its linkage obligation. However, despite the
fact that many options exist few choices are feasible for
the developer.
First, a commercial developer has neither the time nor
the resources to take on an additional housing project --
particularly in a foreign area of development. From a
financial standpoint, it was revealed that it is not
feasible for a developer to build affordable units using its
linkage money as an equity contribution. The projects are
negatively leveraged and yield negative returns. Although
under the proposed tax scenario the three examples were
favorable investments, it is hard to predict what the final
guidelines for the tax code will be.
A developer would also not choose to pay its linkage
payment "upfront" to either the BRA or a designated
developer for two reasons. First, during the initial phases
of most development projects, money is needed to fund lease-
up deficits. Second, by taking the NPV of the linkage cash
streams at the "blended" rate used by the BRA, a developer
would end up paying more in present value terms to the City
than it would pay over a twelve year period to the Fund.
Therefore, the best way to use the linkage money
through the HCO would be to joint venture with a housing
group that has additional housing subsidies in place. The
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money could be used to lower the sales price of a unit or to
offset operating costs for a rental project. This would
enable both the developer and the City to leverage the
linkage money and produce the maximum number of units.
However the likelihood of finding a perfect "match" is slim.
Given that the development options through the HCO
offer only disincentives to the developer, the developer is
left with one choice but to transfer its money to the NTF.
The disincentive system leads one to believe that the HCO
guidelines are seemingly deliberate. It is questionable if
the City will appropriately leverage the linkage funds to
produce the most affordable housing that it can.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of the thesis was to evaluate the impact
of two new City policies on the financial feasibility of a
mixed-use development project. The paper closely examined
the ramifications of linkage and inclusionary zoning from a
political, economical and managerial point of view. Based
upon the analysis and conclusions reached in each chapter,
recommendations to Mariner will be made.
The criteria used to evaluate the optimal route
Mariner should take in satisfying both requirements were as
follows:
1) Political: Which choice will give Mariner the most
leverage from within the City?
2) Economic: Which option makes the most financial
sense?
3) Time and Management Resources: Which option will
Mariner have to be least involved?
4) Homeownership Maximization: Which option will
maximize housing in South Boston?
The recommendations begin by first eliminating the
options that Mariner should not consider and conclude with
the recommended path that Mariner should follow. First,
recommendations for Mariner's linkage obligation will be
outlined followed by recommendations for the inclusionary
housing requirement.
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LINKAGE
1) Mariner should not pay the linkage money upfront.
Mariner does not have the available funds to cash out
of the linkage obligation. Mariner needs the funds in the
earlier phases of the project to defray the high
construction costs and leaseup deficit.
In addition, given the blended discount rate the City
uses to calculate the payment, paying upfront is not
economically sensible. The BRA's "blended" discount rate
calculates a higher linkage payment that Mariner must pay in
comparison to what it would pay over a twelve year period.
2) Mariner should not develop housing on its own.
Mariner is not a housing developer -- particularly an
"affordable" housing developer. Whereas commercial
development requires specific skills so does housing
development.
Mariner is not equipped with the staff nor the
resources to undertake developing affordable housing.
First, packaging financially feasible housing projects for
low to moderate income household is a major endeavor.
Funding sources through the public sector are available but
take an enormous amount of energy to obtain -- especially if
Mariner is unfamiliar with public finance opportunities.
Although Mariner could involve GBCD in putting together a
creative financial package, this would still translate into
additional time for the firm.
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Second, if Mariner chose to build on its own, the firm
would have to put together a development team. The time
involved in selecting an architect, construction manager and
trades people for the project places additional costs on
Mariner not included in the linkage payment.
Considering that the logistics involved in putting the
Pier 4 project in place is a major effort that must be
approached with diligence and an abundance of time. Any
activity added to the already overburdened operations of
Mariner could jeopardize the success of the project. For the
above reasons Mariner should not consider this option.
Building alone could prove to be a major mistake.
3) Mariner should not joint venture with a neighborhood based
housing group.
Mariner should not joint venture with a housing group
unless the group is from South Boston and is ready to build.
The best situation for Mariner would be to connect with a
housing group that is ready to break ground (i.e. building
permits are in place) but is in need of additional financial
support. This route would alleviate the issues of financial
deal structuring, management and construction -- Mariner
would simply transfer the funds to the developer.
As illustrated in the financial analysis section of
the previous chapter, Mariner's linkage money can best be
used by writing down the cost of a for-sale unit. The money
can either be applied to the direct development costs across
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the board, or the funds can be allocated on an as needed
basis. For example, a household may be eligible to
purchase a unit but can not afford the closing costs and the
initial five percent down payment. The money could be used
to cover those additional expenses.
Lastly, if Mariner selects this route, the money
should be put towards for-sale property rather than rental
units. However, it is unlikely that Mariner will be able to
identify a group from South Boston as there is no housing
group in the community.
4) Mariner should transfer its linkage payment to the
Neighborhood Trust Fund
The trust fund is the path of least resistance.
However, is it the path that will provide the best results
for the residents of Boston in need of housing? The issue
is debatable.
If Mariner cannot identify an appropriate housing
group from South Boston which it feels will provide quality
work, then the NTF route should be chosen. Under these
circumstances, Mariner should sign a letter of agreement
with the BRA promising that at least half the linkage funds
will be directed towards the South Boston community. The
terms of the letter should be drafted by both Mariner and
the CAC incorporating as best as it can the needs of the
South Boston Community.
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INCLUSIONARY HOUSING POLICY
1) Mariner should not build the affordable units onsite.
The costs incurred by developing the units on site are
too great for the project to bear. The success of the other
uses on the site become less than feasible, thus hindering
Mariner's ability to find financial backing. By placing the
project at risk, the city may lose out on both linkage funds
for housing and increased tax revenues.
2) Mariner should establish a revolving loan fund to assist
resident first time homebuyers in South Boston.
A revolving loan fund could be used to assist first
time homebuyers in the neighborhood. If a household is
unable to purchase a home due to lack of available funds,
even with a MHFA below-market rate mortgage, funding could
be used to further write down the cost of housing.
3) Mariner should establish a revolving loan fund to be used
for home improvements and neighborhood reinvestment.
The income level of South Boston residents is below
the median income for the City of Boston. The prototypical
affordable unit mentioned throughout the paper, with the
exception of the units in the rental tax scenario, is
affordable to household earning 80% of the median income.
South Boston residents are far below this level. Based on a
median income of $13,000, a South Boston resident could only
afford a home priced at approximately $35,000. Therefore,
even if units were to be included on the Pier 4 site,
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chances are the South Boston residents would not be
qualified homebuyers.
The fact that the median income in South Boston is so
low raises an interesting question. How will the
neighborhood be able to maintain control in its community if
the real estate market continues to expand into the South
Boston area? Much of South Boston's housing stock is
deteriorated -- South Boston is a prime target for
gentrification.
Intensifying the problem of deterioration is the
inability of residents to obtain home improvement loans from
banks at favorable terms. If banks are unwilling to lend
money to residents because incomes are low and conditions
of the neighborhood are poor, then deterioration is
inevitable. It is a Catch-22 that needs to be reversed.
Mariner could establish a revolving loan fund that
would be administered by either the CAC or a group
designated by the CAC. Low interest loans would be made to
South Boston residents to improve both their homes and the
surrounding neighborhood.
While the loan fund does not address the issue of
increasing the housing stock by giving residents the
opportunity to improve their standards of living the housing
stock will improve and South Boston will gain more control
of its own destiny rather than allowing deterioration to
lead to gentrification.
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DISCUSSION ON AND RECOMMENDEATIONS FOR BOTH POLICIES
The City of Boston is looking for new ways to expand
the housing stock available for low to moderate income
households. Two innovative approaches have been adopted
into the City's planning process --linkage and inclusionary
housing. Both policies require developers, who are in the
process of obtaining building permits, to pay additional
money to the City or create additional housing for Boston
residents.
This final section of this chapter will discuss the
two policies. The dialogue that follows will outline
present shortcomings that exist within the administrative
boundries of implementing the policies. The section will
ultimately conclude with suggestions to the City regarding
ways to make the two policies more effective.
Linkage as a Policy
Linkage was amended into Boston's Zoning Code in 1983
as a means of leveraging dollars from commercial real estate
developers to produce affordable housing. Though much
commercial development has ocurred since then, the City
neither has funds nor housing to show for it in terms of the
policy. While at least two to three dozen DIP agreements
have been signed by developers, only one dollar exists in
the Neighborhood Trust Fund. In addition, no housing has
been built.
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Internal Power Struggles: Lack of Consensus
The City speaks of linkage as if it were a success.
Although it may be a success in years to come, the internal
conflicts that exist among various City agencies that
influence developemnt may hinder the successfulness of the
program.
Both the BRA and PFD would like control over the
linkage money. Each agency is responsible for orchestrating
development in different segments of Boston. Each want a
piece of the action. However, conversations with three BRA
officials reveal that there is no consensus amongst top
policy makers in the Flynn administration regarding the
policy. One person stated that developers should not be
allowed to exercise its linkage obligation through the
housing creation option because the City loses its
discretionary powers. Another housing expert at the BRA
remarked that it does not matter what developers do as long
as the BRA gets the money. The third person stated that the
BRA would prefer developers to build as it is what they do
the best. Units would be delivered to Boston residents
faster than if the City were to administer the funds.
Disincentives
The housing creation option offers many possibilities
to developers in terms of creative deal structuring.
Developers can build alone, with a partner, designate a
developer or pay the net present value of the linkage cash
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stream upfront. However, after carefully outlining the
political, managerial, and marketing issues surrounding each
option, the options become less appealing.
If any developer chooses to build then the firm would
need to locate a site, architect, and a construction team.
Next, a developer would need to determine if the units would
be for-sale or rental units. In both instances marketing and
management strategies would need to be designed. Commercial
developers faced with linkage requirements have neither the
time nor the resources to undertake this endeavor.
If a developer chooses to build with a community
developemnt corporation, then the firm needs to locate an
appropriate partner. Joint venturing with another group
would be the best alternative for a developer to choose yet
finding a match that one could do business with as well as
one that the City would approve is another question.
Similarly, if a developer were to designate a CDC, the firm
would once again need to put a lot of consideration into
choosing the appropriate partner.
Lastly, a developer is given the opportunity to
immediately pay the net present value of its cash stream
discounted at a blended rate, to either the BRA or a
designated developer . This option is unfeasible as most
firms desperately need cash during the early years of the
project.
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Therefore, having revealed the process a developer has
to undertake if the HCO option were chosen, it is no wonder
that a developer would transfer money to the Fund. The
management, marketing, and political issues that
confront a developer chosing the HCO route are numerous and
require time and much thought. A developer undertaking a
major project does not have the time nor the resources to
manage the additional development effort.
Loss of Discretionary Powers
The City is concerned with losing its discretionary
powers. Does giving a developer the right to build
affordable housing cause the city to lose its discretionary
powers? If the City implemented the housing creation
option effectively, there would be no concern over a loss of
power. In fact, by having the developer build, there would
be less internal pressure among the City agencies.
Inclusionary Housing as a Policy
The City's draft inclusionary housing policy has
become the 'hot topic' of the Flynn administration.
Although there is no legal basis from which this policy can
be implemented, the Flynn administration has no qualms
about requesting developers to abide by the policy.
The purpose of the policy is twofold. First, through
inclusionary zoning below-market rate housing would be
provided on sites that would otherwise not have included
such units. Second, by producing mixed income housing, the
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City is indirectly promoting the integration of the City's
neighborhoods.
As the draft legislation reads, by cooperating with
the City, developers should obtain density bonuses for the
proposed projects. This is how the policy is being promoted
yet it is not how the policy is being implemented.
Mariner was not given the opportunity to increase the
number of condominiums to be built on the site if it obliged
with the City's inclusionary request. The firm was also not
given bonus space for any of the other uses. In fact,
Mariner had to reduce its FAR from 4.68 to 4.26, a loss of
150,000 commercial square feet.
Private versus Public Land
Developers using private land are required to set
aside 10% of the total residential units for low to moderate
income households. Also, developers using public land are
asked to set aside 35% of the total residential units for
below-market rate housing. Therefore, the burden is felt
by all residential developers.
There is however a major difference between the two
types of landowners. First, when the City transfers land in
residential sections of Boston to a developer, it is often
for the sole purpose of producing affordable housing. The
land is typically awarded to a developer for $1. Following
the dedication of the land, the developer is processed
through the approvals process at a fast pace. For instance,
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when PFD awarded the Bricklayers a site in South Boston for
$1, the Bricklayers received its building permit in less
than three months. The fact that approvals were obtained
quickly was one reason why the housing could be built at
such a low cost. The carrying costs associated with the
preliminary phases of a development project can literally
cripple a project.
The Pier 4 site is valued at $2 million dollars an
acre. Total land costs equal $16 million. Because of the
complexity of the project, and the potential impacts the
project can have on the environment and infrastructure,
Mariner must go through a long approvals process. While this
process is needed for the public good, there is a premium to
be paid for approval delays and that price is borne by the
developer. For Mariner, these costs will exceed $5 million
before construction begins.
The City should not overlook the fact that specific
aspects of Mariner's project are very expensive - in
particular, the construction and soft costs associated with
the geotechnical difficulties of the land. Therefore, the
more risks associated with a site the higher the financial
burden will be on a developer. In the past the City has
assisted waterfront developers in keeping the development
costs low through either land writedowns or tax abatements.
Pier 4 will be 100% privately financed.
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Who will Purchase the Units?
Assuming that the below market rate units are built
onsite how likely is it that South Boston residents will be
able to afford the prices? In the housing affordablity
analysis, it was revealed that a unit could be sold for
$120,000 and still be affordable to a household of
5 earning 120% of the area's median income.
Although selling the units at this price would have
little impact on the financial gap created by the units,
Mariner would sell the units at the highest maximum price
allowed by the housing guidelines. Given this fact, a South
Boston resident, with a median income of $13,000 would not
be able to purchase a unit on the Pier 4 site. A South
Boston resident would be required to have an income at least
three times as much as the average South Boston resident
presently earns.
In sum, if the City's goal is to maximize the number
of units for low to moderate income households, the city is
not achieving this goal by requiring Mariner to build
on site. The opportunity cost of building units elsewhere
reveals this fact.
Low income housing is what the City should be striving
to produce. It is not difficult to produce a unit at
$70,000 - but to get the price down to a level where it is
affordable to a household earning 50% of the median income
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is a goal worth pursuing. Therefore, the city should
evaluate the appropriateness of the requirement on a project
by project basis.
The Impact of Both Requirements on the Pier 4 Project
The City should reconsider the two policies in light
of mixed use developments projects. Mariner is being
financially penalized by the two policies. For example, the
total square footage of International Place is approximately
1.7 million. The developer's linkage requirement is
approximately $6 million. Mariner's project is also 1.7
million square and the linkage payment is close to $6 million.
However, because of the residential portion of the project,
Mariner must also respond to the inclusionary requirement.
While the two policies alone are justifiable, together
the impact is extraordinarily severe. If Mariner's project
is threatened to the point where it will not take place,
then the City will not receive any housing or cash
equivalent. It is ironic that while the City is promoting
commercial developers to build residential units on site, it
is also requiring developers to address two housing policies
that could potentially damage the economics of the projects.
Based upon these conclusions the City should reconsider the
financial burden it is imposing upon Mariner as well as all
developers undertaking mixed-use development.
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Recommendations for Linkage
1) Development Partner Matching Service
Upon entering a DIP agreement with the City, the
developer in question should be given the following
information: a list of city-owned parcels in the "impacted"
area, a list of housing groups , and a list of projects in
the pipeline that need financial assistance. The BRA and
PFD have this information at their fingertips. Both
agencies should use available resources to its benefit.
2) Translate Dollars into Units
Boston's linkage program was modeled after San
Fransisco's Office Affordable Housing Production program
(OAHPP). Except for the general concept of linkage the two
programs have little in common. To begin with, the program,
which has been operating for five years, has leveraged $28
million to produce approximately 5000 units. Mayor Flynn
claims that the $35 million dollars earmarked will only be
able to produce 500 units.
The major difference between the two programs is that
in San Fransisco, when a developer enters into a linkage
agreement, the development firm is told the number of units
it must build. If the developer chooses not to build, then
the units are translated into a dollar equivalent.
In Boston, it is the other way around. The developer
is told how much money is owed to the City. The developer
must then figure out the number of units to produce. If a
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developer were told how many units he or she should build
rather than given a sum of money to be paid to the
City, housing would be produced sooner, and more
efficiently.
The OAHPP program is set up so that the City will
receive either the housing or the cash equivalent when the
builder receives a final certificate of occupancy. San
Fransisco incorporated this method as a safety valve to
protect itself against projects failing.
In San Fransisco, if a project were foreclosed five or
six years into operations, the City would have already
received its money or housing equivalent. Also, in present
value terms, the money is worth more than it would be five
years down the line. However, as it is set up in Boston, a
developer pays the City over a 12 or 7 year period,
depending upon when the DIP agreement was signed.
Recommendations for Inclusionary Zoni
1) Suspend Either Linkage of Inclusionary Zoning for
Mixed-Use Projects.
Developers undertaking mixed-use projects should not
be required to respond to both linkage and inclusionary
zoning. Similar to San Fransisco, the City should indicate
to the developer how many units should be produced as a
result of the mixed-use project. The developer should then
be given the option to either build those units on site,
(and if so obtain density bonuses), transfer a cash
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equivalent to the neighborhood trust fund, or build the
units off site.
2) Have the City Purchase Units from Developer at Cost
and Sell to Low to Moderate income Households
Inclusionary housing requirements should be based upon
the costs of individual development projects. The City
should determine a cut-off point when it becomes financially
infeasible to build affordable units on site.
One suggestion which could determine whether or not
units should be built on or off site is to have the city buy
the units at cost. The City could then sell the units to
first time homebuyers eligible for MHFA financing. If the
mortgage amount of the unit is still too high for the
household to pay, (based upon MHFA income standards), then
the City should kick in the additional linkage funds to
lower the housing costs. If the City finds that a unit is
too expensive for it to carry, even at cost and with linkage
money, then the developer of that project should be allowed
to develop the units off site.
3) Create an Incentive System
Incentives should be offered to developers for building
affordable units. Density bonuses could be awarded, as well
as tax abatements until a project has been in full operation
for one year.
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CONCLUSION
Originally, when linkage was introduced by the former
Mayor White as a policy, Boston's economy was strong.
Developers were willing to pay the additional money for the
ability to build in the City. Although some developers
opposed the policy, the linkage exaction did not threaten
the viability of development projects.
First, The office market was strong -- the risks were
minimal. And second, in terms of Boston's building boom,
linkage was not introduced at a time when the developers
participating in the boom would have been affected. Most
of the projects in the pipeline did not fall victim of the
policy. Either permits had already been obtained (or soon
to be) by developers or construction for various projects
were well underway.
Now, as development is slowing down and the
possibilities of the office market contracting, the policies
could serve as deterrents for development. While
individually linkage and inclusionary housing may be
financially tolerable, together, the two policies are
inappropriate. If the City is trying to encourage mixed-use
development, yet pressures developers to address both
linkage and inclusionary housing policies -- especially
during a period when the market is questionable, the City
risks losing a substantial amount of economic benefits.
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The guidelines and implementation processes of the
policies need to be reconsidered in lieu of market
conditions, the financial impact on development projects,
and the maximization of affordable housing for Boston
residents. The City can utilize the private development
sector by offering it incentives to build affordable housing
rather than presenting developers with the disincentives
mentioned throughout this paper.
In sum, the impacts of inclusionary zoning and linkage
extend far beyond a developer's purse. The manner in which
the City designs, implements and enforces both policies will
ultimately effect not only the developer but more
importantly, those people in which the programs are intended
to serve -- low to moderate income households.
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COST BREAKDOWN FOR RENTAL PROPERTY
(The unit costs are identical for all the rental projects) Assumptions
# of units (NU)
Sross Living Space (BLA)
Parkinq Area (PA)
Efficiency Factor (EFF)
Net Living Area (NLA)
13
950 per unit psf
325 per space psf
0.85
807.5
Land I
Int. Rate 0.105
Term- 30
Vacancy 0.05
Opex 0.25 cf EGI
Sbft Costs 0.3 of HC
DCR 1.1
ACQUISITION COSTS $1
HARD COSTS
Building (BC)
Parking (PC)
$60 psf
$10 psf
Total Hard Cost (HC)
SOFT COSTS
30% of HC
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS (TDC)
Development Costs per Unit
$741 000
$42,250
$783,251
$234,975
$1 ,018,226
$78,325
108
INCOME MIX I
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of Units 12 Financing
1 BR 6 TDC $9861
2 BR 6 Loan:Value 54I
Rent/Unit Loan Amount $528,121
1 BR Per Month $544 Interest 10.5%
2 BR Per Month $608 Term 30
Parking Per Month $25 Debt Svc $58,372
Gross Living Space (SF) E uity Needed $458,481
Parking Area F) 325 DCR 1.1
Net Living Area (SF)
Vacancy 5%
Operating Expenses (% of EGI 25%
OPERATING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue $91,728
I BR $39,168
2 BR $48,960
Parking $3,600
Vacancy Allowance ($4,586)
Effective Gross Income $87,142
Operating Expenses ($21,785)
Net Operating Income $65,356
Return on Asset (NOI/TDC) 6.61
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OPERATING PRO FORMA: INCOME MIX 1
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 6 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
One Bedroom
Two Bedroom
Parking
Potential Gross Income
5% Vacancy
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Plus Sales Proceeds
Less Debt Repayment
Before Tax Cash Flow
-Depreciation
+Amortization
Taxable Income
Tax (Liability)Benefit
After Tax Cash Flow
After Tax Return Equity
On Investment
Net Present Value
IRR
$39,168 $41,126 $43,183 $45,342 $47,609$57,120 $59,976 $62,975 $66,124 $69,430
$3,900 $4,095 $4,300 $4,515 $4,740
$100,188 $105,197 $110,457 $115,980 $121,779
($5,009) ($5,260) ($5,523) ($5,799) ($6,089)
$95,179 $99,938 $104,934 $110,181 $115,690
($25,047) ($26,299) ($27,614) ($28,995) ($30,445)
$70,132 $73,638 $77,320 $81,186 $85,245
($64,700) ($64,700) ($64,700) ($64,700) ($64,700)
$12,620 $16,486 $20,545
($33,941) ($33,941) ($33,941)
$3,951 $4,366 $4,825
($17,369) ($13,089) ($8,571)
$8,685 $6,544 $4,285
$21,305 $23,030 $24,831
4.92% 5.32% 5.74%
$49,989 $52,489
$72,901 $76,546
$4,977 $5,226
$127,868
($6,393)
$121,475
($31,967)
$89,508
($64,700)
$24,807
($33,941)
$5,331
($3,802)
$1,901
$26,708
6.17%
$134,262
($6,713)
$127,548
($33,565)
$93,983
($64,700)
$29,283
($33,941)
$5,891
$1,233
($617)
$28,666
6.62%
$55,113 $57,869
$80,374 $84,392
$5,488 $5,762
$140,975 $148,023
($7,049) ($7,401)
$133,926 $140,622
($35,244) ($37,006)
$98,682 $103,616
($64,700) ($64,700)
$33,982
($33,941)
$6,510
$6,551
($3,276)
$30,707
7.09%
$38,916
($33,941)
$7,193
$12,169
($6,084)
$32,832
7.58%
$60,762
$88,612
$6,050
$155,424
$63,801
$93,042
$6,353
$163,196
($7,771) ($8,160)
$147,653 $155,036
($38,856) ($40,799)
$108,797 $114,237
($64,700) ($64,700)
$531,123
($523,758)
$44,097 $56,902
($33,941) ($33,941)
$7,949 $8,783
$18,105 $31,745
($9,052) ($15,872)
$35,045 $41,030
8.10% 9.48%
$1,018,226
Gain on Sale
Sales proceeds $1,142,370
-Net Gain on Sale ($704,926)
Gain on Sale $437,444
Cap.Gain Tax Rate 0.2
Capital Gain $87,489
Sales Price
-Income Tax
-Mtg.Balance
Net Cash from
Sale
$1,142,370
($87,489)
($523,758)
$531,123
$5,431
($33,941)
$3,236
($25,273)
$12,637
$18,068
4.17%
$8,938
($33,941)
$3,576
($21,427)
$10,713
$19,651
4.54%
($432,855)
$432,855
($267,107)
0.22%
0
INCOME MIX 2
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of
1 BR @
2 BR
I BR
2 BR
Units
80% of Median Income
80% of Mediar Income
120% of Median Income
120% of Median Income
21
2
3
4
12
Rent/Unit
I BR Per Month 80% $544
2 BR Per Month 80% $608
1 BR Per Month 120% $807
2 BR Per Month 120% $956
Parking Per Month $25
Gross Living Space (SF) 1000
Parking Area F) 325
Net Livinq Area (SF) 850
Vacancy 5%
Operating Empenses (7 of EGI) 25%
Financing
TDC
Loan: Value
Loan Amount
interest
Term
Debt Svc
Equity Needed
D CR
OPERAT ING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue
I BR
2 BR
I BR
2 BR
Parking
Vacancy Allowance
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Return on Asset (NCI/TDC)
$13,056
$24,480
$38, 736
$1371664
$3, 600
111
$1,726,726
737
$1,268 ,i0
10.5%
30
$140, 15O$458 481
1.1
$217,536
($10,877)
$206, 65
($51,665)
$154,994
9.0%
OPERATING PROFORMA: INCOME MIX 2
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
One Bedroom
Two Bedroom
One Bedroom (MHFA)
Two Bedroom (MHFA)
Parking
Potential Gross Income
5% Vacancy
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expense
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Plus Sales Proceeds
Less Mtg. Payback
Before Tax Cash Flow
- Depreciation
+ Amortization
Taxable Income
Tax (Liability)Benefit
After Tax Cash Flow ($441,057)
After Tax Return
On Investment
$19,584 $20,563 $2i, 1 $22,671 $23,804 $24,995
$32,640 $34,272 $35,986 $37,785 $39,674 $41,658
$48,420 $50,841 $53,383 $56,052 $58,855 $61,798
$137,664 $144,547 $151,775 $159,363 $167,331 $175,698
$7,200 $7,560 $7,938 $8,335 $8,752 $9,189
$245,508 $257,783 $270,673 $284,206 '$298,417 $313,337
($12,275) ($12,889) ($13,534) ($14,210) ($14,921) ($15,667)
$233,233 $244,894 $257,139 $269,996 $283,496 $297,670
($58,308) ($61,224) ($64,285) ($67,499) ($70,874) ($74,418)
$174,924 $183,671 $192,854 $202,497 $212,622 $223,253
($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)
$24,648 $33,832
($62,660) ($62,660)
$8,789 $9,712
($29,222) ($19,116)
$14,611 $9,558
$39,260 $43,390
8.90% 9.84%
$43,475 -
($62,660)
$10,732
($8,453)
$4,227
$47,701
10.82%
$53,600 $64,231
($62,660) ($62,660)
$11,859 $13,104
$2,798 $14,674
($1,399) ($7,337)
$52,200 $56,893
11.84% 12.90%
$26,244 $27,557 $28,934 $30,381
$43,741 $45,928 $48,224 $50,635
$64,887 $68,132 $71,538 $75,115
$184,483 $193,707 $203,392 $213,562
$9,649 $10,131 $10,638 $11,170
$329,004 $345,454 $362,727 $380,863
($16,450) ($17,273) ($18,136) ($19,043)
$312,554 $328,182 $344,591 $361,820
($78,138) ($82,045) ($86,148) ($90,455)
$234,415 $246,136 $258,443 $271,365
($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)($159,022)
$75,393
($62, 660)
$14,480
$27,213
($13,607)
$61,787
$87,114
($62, 660)
$16,000
$40,454
($20,227)
$66,887
$99,421 $112,343
($62,660) ($62,660)
$17,680 $19,537
$54,441 $69,220
($27,221) ($34,610)
$72,200 $77,733
14.01% 15.17% 16.37% 17.62%
$31,900
$53,167
$78,871
$224,240
$11,728
$399,907
($19,995)
$379,911
($94,978)
$284,933
($159,022)
$1,493,439
$1,287,309)
$332,041
($62,660)
$21,588
$290,969
($145,484)
$186,556
42.30%
Gain on Sale
Sale Proceeds
-Net Gain on Sale
Gain on Sale
Cap.Gain Tax Rate
Cap Gain
Sales Price
-Income Tax
-Mtg.Balance
Net Cash from
Sale
Net Present Value ($57,923)
IRR 7.64%
$15,902
($62,660)
$7,954
($38,804)
$19,402
$35,304
8.00%
$2,849,335
($2,506,402)
$342,933
0.2
$68,587
$2,849,335
($68,587)
($1,287,309)
$1,493,439
C14
-- I
-4
INCOME MIX THREE
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of
I BR
2 BR §
Units
80% of Median income
80% of Median Income
1 BR @ 120Z of Median Income
2 BR @ 120Z of Median Income
1 BR MKT Rate
2 BR MKT Rate
Rent/Unit
I BR Per Month 801
2 BR Per Month 801
I BR Per Month 1201
2 BR Per Month 1201
I BR Per Month MYT
2 BR Per Month MKT
Parking Per Month
Gross Living Space (SF)
Parking Area (SF)
Net Living Area (SF)
vacancy
Operating Expenses (1 of EGI)
5
5Li4
'1
2
'35
$544
$608
$807
$956
$1,000
$1,300$25
1000
325
850
5125'fA.J /a
Financing
TDC
Loan:Value
Loan Amount
interest
Term
Debt Svc
Equity Needed
DER
OPERATING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue
I BR
2 BR
I BR
2 BR
I BR Mkt rate
2 BR Mkt rate
Parking
Vacancy Allowance
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Return on Asset (NOi/TDC)
$32, 640
$40,800
$9, 84
S22 924
$6,C)000$78, o0
$6,300
113
$1,726,726
751~S1,303,3"05
~10. 51
30
$144 052
$4231421
1.1
$226,348
(311,317)
$215,031
($53,758)
$161,273
9.31
OPERATING PRO FORMA: INCOME MIX 3
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
One BR (BMR)
Two BR (BMR)
One BR (MHFA)
Two BR (MHFA)
One BR (MKT)
Two BR (MKT)
Parking
Potential Gross Income
5% Vacancy Factor
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Plus Sale Proceeds
Less Debt Repayment
Before Tax Cash Flow
-Depreciation
+Amortization
Taxable Income
Tax (Liability) Benefit
After Tax Cash ($440,112)
After Tax Return
On Investment
Net Present Value
IRR
$39,168
$57,120
$19,368
$22,944
$48,000
$78,000
$7,800
$272,400
($13,620)
$258,780
($64,695)
$194,085
($176,441)
$17,644
($67,882)
$8,825
($41,412)
$20,706
$38,350
8.71%
($20,266)
9.20%
$41,126 $43,183 $45,342 $47,609 $49,989
$59,976 $62,975 $66,124 $69,430 $72,901
$20,336 $21,353 $22,421 $23,542 $24,719
$24,091 $25,296 $26,561 $27,889 $29,283
$50,400 $52,920 $55,566 $58,344 $61,262
$81,900 $85,995 $90,295 $94,809 $99,550
$8,190 $8,600 $9,029 $9,481 $9,955
$286,020 $300,321 $315,337 $331,104 $347,659
($14,301) ($15,016) ($15,767) ($16,555) ($17,383)
$271,719 $285,305 $299,570 $314,549 $330,276
($67,930) ($71,326) ($74,893) ($78,637) ($82,569)
$203,789 $213,979 $224,678 $235,912 $247,707
($176,441) ($176,441) ($176,441) ($176,441) ($176,441)
$27,348
($67,882)
$9,752
($30,781)
$15,391
$42,739
9.71%
$37,538
($67,882)
$10,776
($19,568)
$9,784
$47,322
10.75%
$48,237
($67,882)
$11,907
($7,738)
$3,869
$52,106
11.84%
$59,471
($67,882)
$13,158
$4,747
($2,373)
$57,097
12.97t
$71,266
($67,882)
$14,539
$17,924
($8,962)
$62,304
14.16%
$52,489
$76,546
$25,955
$30,747
$64,325
$104,527
$10,453
$365,042
($18,252)
$346,790
($86,697)
$260,092
($176,441)
$83,652
($67,882)
$16,066
$31,836
($15,918)
$67,734
15.39%
$55,113
$80,374
$27,253
$32,285
$67,541
$109,754
$10,975
$383,294
($19,165)
$364,129.
($91,032)
$273,097
($176,441)
$96,656
($67,882)
$17,753
$46,527
($23,264)
$73,393
16.68%
$57,869
$84,392
$28,615
$33,899
$70,918
$115,242
$11,524
$402,459
($20,123)
$382,336
($95,584)
$286,752
($176,441)
$110,311
($67,882)
$19,617
$62,046
($31,023)
$79,288
18.02%
$60,762 $63,801
$88,612
$30,046
$35,594
$74,464
$121,004
$12,100
$422,582
($21,129
$401,453
($100,363)
$301,090
($176,441)
$124,649
($67,882)
$21,677
$78,444
($39,222)
$85,427
19.41%
$93,042
$31,548
$37,373
$78,187
$127,054
$12,705
$443,711
($22,186)
$421,525
-It
Gain- on Sale
Sales Price $3,161,440
-Net Gain ($2,783,150)
Gain on Sale $378,290
Cap.Gain Tax Rate 0.2
Capital Gain $75,658
-----------------------
Sale Price
-Income Tax
-Mtg Balance
Net Cash from
Sale
$3,161,440
($75,658)
($1,428,316)
$1,657,466
($105,381)
$316,144
($176,441)
$1,657,466
($1,428,316)
$368,852
($67,882)
$23,953
$324,923
($162,462)
$206,391
46.90%
)
INCOME MIX FOUR
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of Units
1 BR e 50%
2 BR e 50%
I BR 80%
2 BR 80%
Rent/Unit
1 BR Per Month 1 501
2 BR Per Month @ 501
I BR Per Month e 801
2 BR Per Month e 807
Parking Per Month
Gross Living Space (SF)
Parking Area (SF)
Net Living Area (SF)
Vacancy
Operating Expenses (Q of ESI)
12
6
6
$425
$549
$544
$680
$25
900
325
765
51
251
Financing
TDC
Loan:Value
Loan Amount
Interest
Term
Debt Svc
Equity Needed
DCR
OPERATING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue
I BR @ 501
2 BR @ 501
I BR @ 801
2 BR @ 801
Parking
Vacancy Allowance
Effective Gross Incoae
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Return on Asset (NOI/TDC)
$10,200
$13,176
$32,640
$40, 800
$4,200
115
$1,041,951
$591.982
10.51
30
$58,372
$449,970
1.1
$101,016
($5,051)
$95,965
($23,991)
$71,974
6.91
OPERATING PRO FORMA:
INCOME MIX 4
Assumes Tax Credits for Below Mkt. Rate Units.
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
Potential Gross Income
5% Vacancy
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Plus Sales Proceeds
Less Debt Repayment
Before Tax Cash Flow
-Depreciation
+Amortization
Taxable Income
Tax (Liability)Benefit
Credit
After Tax Cash Flow
After Tax Return
On Investment
$10,710
$13,835
$34,272
$42,840
$4,410
$11,246
$14,527
$35,986
$44,982
$4,631
$11,808 $12,398 $13,018 $13,669 $14,352 $15,070 $15,824 $16,615
$16,016
$39,674
$49,593
$5,105
$122,786
($6,139)
$116,646
($30,696)
$85,950
($65,431)
$16,816 $17,657
$41,658 $43,741
$52,072 $54,676
$5,360 $5,628
$128,925 $135,371
($6,446)
$122,479
($32,231)
$90,247
($65,431)
($6,769)
$128,603
($33,843)
$94,760
($65,431)
$18,540
$45,928
$57,410
$5,910
$ 42,140
($7,107)
$135,033
($35,535)
$99,498
($65,431)
$19,467
$48,224
$60,280
$6,205
$149,247
($7,462)
$141,784
($37,312)
$104,473
($65,431)
$20,440
$50,635
$63,294
$6,516
$15,253
$37,785
$47,231
$4,862
$101,016 $106,067 $111,370 $116,939
($5,051)
$95,965
($25,254)
$70,711
($65,431)
($5,303)
$100,763
($26,517)
$74,247
($65,431)
($5,569)
$105,802
($27,843)
$77,959
($65,431)
($5,847)
$111,092
($29,235)
$81,857
($65,431)
$5,280 $8,816 $12,528 $16,426 $20,519 $24,817 $29,329 $34,067 $39,042
($34,732)
$3,273
($26,179)
$13,089
$53,586
($34,732)
$3,616
($22,299)
$11,150
$53,586
($34,732)
$3,996
($18,207)
$9,104
$53,586
($34,732)
$4,416
($13,890)
$6,945
$53,586
($34,732)
$4,879
($9,333)
$4,667
$53,586
$71,956 $73,552 $75,218 $76,957 $78,772
15.99% 16.35% 16.72% 17.10% 17.51%
($34,732)
$5,392
($4,523)
$2,262
$53,586
$80,664
17.93%
($34,732)
$5,958
$555
($278)
$53,586
$82,637
18.37%
($34,732)
$6,583
$5,919
($2,959)
$53,586
$84,694
18.82%
($34,732)
$7,275
$11,585
($5,792)
$53,586
$86,836
19.30%
$21,462
$53,167
$66,459
$6,841
$156,709 $164,544
($7,835) ($8,227)
$148,874 $156,317
($39,177) ($41,136)
$109,696 $115,181
($65,431) ($65,431)
$474,032
($529,673)
$44,265 ($5,890)
($34,732)
$8,038
$17,572
($8,786)
$53,586
$89,065
19.79%
($34,732)
$8,883
($31,739)
$15,869
$1,041,951
Gain on Sale
Sales proceeds $1,151,811
-Net Gain on Sale ($728,651)
Gain on Sale $423,160
Cap.Gain Tax Rate 0.35
Capital Gain $148,106
Sales Price
-Income Tax
-Mtg.Balance
Net Cash from
Sale
$1,151,811
($148,106)
($529,673)
$474,032
$9,980
2.22%
Net Present Value 1 10% $36,330
IRR 11.50%
One Bedroom LOW
Two Bedroom LOW
One Bedroom MOD
Two Bedroom MOD
Parking
$10,200
$13,176
$32,640
$40,800
$4,200
-4
($449,970)
$449,970
INCOME MIX 5
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of Units
I BR 1 50% of Median Inces
2 BR @ 50% of Median Incom
I BR @ 80% of Median Incom
2 BR @ 80% of Median Incom
I BR @ 120t
2 BR @ 120%
Rent/Unit
1 BR Per Month 5
2 BR Per Month
1 BR Per Month B
2 BR Per Month 8
I BR Per Month 12
2 BR Per Month 12
Parking Per Month
Gross Living Space (SF)
Parkinq Area iSF)
Net Living Area (SF)
Vacancy
Operating Expenses (% of EGI)
e
e
e
e
0%
0%
0%OX
01
19
2
4
5
8425
$495
$544
$680$807
$956
$25
900
325
765
57.
25 %
Financing
TDC
Loan:Value
Loan Amount
Interest
Term
Debt Svc
Equity Needed
DCR
OPERATING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue
I BR @ 50%
2 BR @ 50%
1 BR @ 80%
2 BR @ 80%
i BR @ 1201
2 BR @ 120%
Parking
Vacancy Allowance
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
$167,352
$10,200
$17,820
$13:056
$24,480
$38, 736
$57,360
$5,700
($8,368)
$1593 84
($39,746)
$119,238
Return on Asset (NOI/TDC) 8.41
-------------------------------------------------------------
117
$1,414,076
69%
$980 ,729
10.5%
3C
$108,398
$433,348
1.1
OPERATING PROFORMA: INCOME MIX 5
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
One Bedroom (low) $10,200 $10,710 $11,246 $11,808 $12,398 $13,018 $13,669 $14,352 $15,070 $15,824 $16,615
Two Bedroom (low) $17,820 $18,711 $19,647 $20,629 $21,660 $22,743 $23,881 $25,075 $26,328 $27,645 $29,027
One Bedroom (mod) $13,056 $13,709 $14,394 $15,114 $15,870 $16,663 $17,496 $18,371 $19,290 $20,254 $21,267
Two Bedroom (mod) $24,480 $25,704 $26,989 $28,339 $29,756 $31,243 $32,806 $34,446 $36,168 $37,977 $39,875
One Bedroom (MHFA) $38,736 $40,673 $42,706 $44,842 $47,084 $49,438 $51,910 $54,505 $57,231 $60,092 $63,097
Two Bedroom (MHFA) $57,360 $60,228 $63,239 $66,401 $69,721 $73,208 $76,868 $80,711 $84,747 $88,984 $93,433
Parking $5,700 $5,985 $6,284 $6,598 $6,928 $7,275 $7,639 $8,020 $8,421 $8,843 $9,285
Potential Gross Income $167,352 $175,720 $184,506 $193,731 $203,417 $213,588 $224,268 $235,481 $247,255 $259,618 $272,599
5% Vacancy ($8,368) ($8,786) ($9,225) ($9,687) ($10,171) ($10,679) ($11,213) ($11,774) ($12,363) ($12,981) ($13,630)
Effective Gross Income $158,984 $166,934 $175,280 $184,044 $193,247 $202,909 $213,054 $223,707 $234,892 $246,637 $258,969
Operating Expense ($39,746) ($41,733) ($43,820) ($46,011) ($48,312) ($50,727) ($53,264) ($55,927) ($58,723) ($61,659) ($64,742)
Net Operating Income $119,238 $125,200 $131,460 $138,033 $144,935 $152,182 $159,791 $167,780 $176,169 $184,978 $194,227
-4
-4Debt Service ($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398)($108,398) ($108,398)
Plus Sales Proceeds $1,062,825 Gain on Sale
Less Mtg. Payback ($877,502)
Sale Proceeds $1,942,266
-Adjusted Basis ($1,932,571)
Before Tax Cash Flow $10,840 $16,802 $23,062 $29,635 $36,536 $43,783 $51,392 $59,382 $67,771 $76,579 $271,151 Gain on Sale $9,695
- Depreciation ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) ($47,136) Cap.Gain Tax Rate 0.2
+ Amortization $5,422 $5,991 $6,620 $7,315 $8,084 $8,932 $9,870 $10,907 $12,052 $13,317 $14,716 Cap Gain $1,939
Taxable Income ($30,874) ($24,343) ($17,454) ($10,186) ($2,516) $5,580 $14,127 $23,153 $32,687 $42,761 $238,731
Sales Price $1,942,266
Tax (Liability)Benefit $15,437 $12,171 $8,727 $5,093 $1,258 ($2,790) ($7,063) ($11,576) ($16,343) ($21,380) ($119,365) -Income Tax ($1,939)
Credit $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655 $44,655
-Mtg.Balance ($877,502)
After Tax Cash Flow ($433,348) $70,932 $73,628 $76,444 $79,383 $82,449 $85,648 $88,984 $92,461 $96,082 $99,854 $151,786 Net Cash from $1,062,825
Sale
After Tax Return 16.37% 16.99% 17.64% 18.32% 19.03% 19.76% 20.53% 21.34% 22.17% 23.04% 35.03%
On Investment
Net Present Value $124,422
IRR 15.31%
INCOME MIX 6
HOUSING OPERATING PROFORMA
Number of Units 26 Financing
I BR # 50% of Median Income 3 TDC $1,414.076
2 BR @ 50% of Median Income 3 Loan:Value 69,
1 BR @ 80% of Median Income 5 Loan Amount $980,729
2 BR @ 80% of Median Income 5 Interest 10.51
1 BR # Market 5 Term 30
2 BR @ Market 5 Debt Svc
Rent/Unit Equity Needed $433,348
1 BR Per Month 50% $425 DER 1.1
2 BR Per Month 50% $495
1 BR Per Month 80% $544
2 BR Per Month 801% $680
I BR Per Month MKT $1,000
2 BR Per Month MKT $11300
Parking Per Month $25
Gross Living Space (SF) 900
Parking Area (F) 325
Net Living Area (SF) 765
Vacancy 5%
Operating Expenses (Z of EGI) 25I
OPERATING PROFORMA
Potential Gross Revenue $252,360
1 BR @ 50% $15,300
2 BR @ 50% $17,820
1 BR @ B0% $32,640
2 BR @ 80% $408s00
1 BR @ MKT $601000
2 BR @ MKi $78,000
Parking $7,800
Vacancy Allowance ($12618)
Effective Gross Income $239,742
Operating Expenses ($59,936)
Net Operating Income $179,807
Return on Asset (NGI/TDC) 12.7%
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OPERATING PROFORMA: Income Mix 6
Rental Income Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11
One BR (BMR)
Two BR (BMR)
One BR (MHFA)
Two BR (MHFA)
One BR (MKT)
Two BR (MKT)
Parking
Potential Gross Income
5% Vacancy Factor
Effective Gross Income
Operating Expenses
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Plus Sale Proceeds
Less Debt Repayment
Before Tax Cash Flow
-Depreciation
+Amortization
Taxable Income
Tax (Liability) Benefit
Credit
After Tax Cash ($456,152)
After Tax Return
On Investment
$32,640 $34,272 $35,986 $37,785 $39,674 $41,658 $43,741 $45,928 $48,224 $50,635 $53,167
$40,800
$15,300
$17,820
$60,000
$78,000
$7,800
$252,360
$42,840
$16,065
$18,711
$63,000
$81,900
$8,190
$264,978
$44,982
$16,868
$19,647
$66,150
$85,995
$8,600
$278,227
$47,231
$17,712
$20,629
$69,458
$90,295
$9,029
$292,138
$49,593
$18,597
$21,660
$72,930
$94,809
$9,481
$306,745
$52,072
$19,527
$22,743
$76,577
$99,550
$9,955
$322,082
$54,676
$20,503
$23,881
$80,406
$104,527
$10,453
$338,187
$57,410
$21,529
$25,075
$84,426
$109,754
$10,975
$355,096
$60,280
$22,605
$26,328
$88,647
$115,242
$11,524
$372,851
$63,294
$23,735
$27,645
$93,080
$121,004
$12,100
$391,493
($12,618) ($13,249) ($13,911) ($14,607) ($15,337) ($16,104) ($16,909) ($17,755) ($18,643) ($19,575)
$239,742 $251,729 $264,316 $277,531 $291,408 $305,978 $321,277 $337,341 $354,208 $371,919
($59,936) ($62,932) ($66,079) ($69,383) ($72,852) ($76,495) ($80,319) ($84,335) ($88,552) ($92,980)
$179,807 $188,797 $198,237 $208,148 $218,556 $229,484 $240,958 $253,006 $265,656 $278,939
($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)($163,460)
$16,346
($64,502)
$8,176
$25,336 $34,776
($64,502) ($64,502)
$9,035 $9,983
($39,980) ($30,131) ($19,742)
$19,990 $15,065 $9,871
$65,494 $65,494 $65,494
$101,830
22.32%
$105,896 $110,141
23.22% 24.15%
$44,688
($64,502)
$11,031
$55,095
($64,502)
$12,190
$66,023
($64,502)
$13,470
$77,497
($64,502)
$14,884
$89,545
($64,502)
$16,447
($8,782) $2,783 $14,991 $27,880 $41,490
$4,391
$65,494
$ 14,573
25.12%
($1,392)
$65,494
$119,198
26.13%
($7,496)
$65,494
$124,022
27.19%
($13,940)
$65,494
$129,052
28.29%
($20.745)
$65,494
$134,294
29.44%
$102,196
($64,502)
$18,174
$55,868
($27,934)
$65,494
$139,756
30.64%
$66,459
$24,922
$29,027
$97,734
$127,054
$12,705
$411,068
($20,553)
$390,514
($97,629)
$292,886
($163,460)
$1,548,763
($1,323,238)
$115,478 $354,951
($64,502) ($64,502)
$20,082 $22,191
$71,059 $312,640
($35,529) ($156,320)
$65,494
$145,443
31.88%
Sales Price $2,928,858
-Net Gain ($2,644,570)
Gain on Sale $284,288
Cap.Gain Tax 0.2
Capital Gain $56,858
---------------------
Sale Price $2,928,858
-Income Tax ($56,858)
-Mtg Balance ($1,323,238)
Net Cash from $1,548,763
Sale
$198,631
43.54%
Net Present Value $342,800
IRR 23.02%
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